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NORTH CAROLINA’S REINCARNATED JOINT
TENANCY: OH INTENT, WHERE ART THOU?*
DANIEL R. TILLY** & PATRICK K. HETRICK***
A mother, her daughter, and her son-in-law received title to a
North Carolina home as joint tenants with right of survivorship.
Little did the mother know that she was almost instantly
destroying the newborn joint tenancy when, in order to finance
the purchase price, she alone executed a mortgage note and deed
of trust at the closing. When she died several years later with that
mortgage loan in default, a legal dispute arose centered on
whether “severance” of the joint tenancy had occurred.
Following traditional joint tenancy law theory, the Court of
Appeals decided somewhat reluctantly that the joint tenancy was
indeed severed at the very closing during which it was
successfully created; for by executing the deed of trust, the
mother had conveyed “title” according to North Carolina’s title
theory of mortgage law. Under a common law “four unities”
analysis, her execution of the deed of trust unilaterally destroyed
the unity of title required for a joint tenancy and automatically
converted it into a tenancy in common. Contrary to what was
most likely intended as part of an informal family estate and
eldercare plan, her fifty percent undivided interest in the home
remained in her estate at her death and did not pass by
survivorship to her daughter and son-in-law.1
This article addresses key real property and public policy issues
triggered by the 1990 legislative reincarnation of the joint tenancy
with right of survivorship in North Carolina with a special
emphasis on creation and severance issues. It also focuses on
piecemeal statutory amendments and revisions to North Carolina
joint tenancy law since 1990. The authors’ analysis leads to the
* © 2015 Daniel R. Tilly & Patrick K. Hetrick.
** Assistant Professor of Law and Director of Advocacy Programs, Campbell
University School of Law.
*** Professor of Law, Campbell University School of Law. The authors acknowledge
with appreciation the assistance and contributions of the following research assistants in
preparation of this article: Amanda J. Brookie, Bryan Clausing, Lauren E. Fussell, Sean
Madden, Kruti H. Patel, Mary Katherine Perkinson, and Lauren Suber.
1. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v. Reed, 220 N.C. App. 504, 504–07, 725 S.E.2d
667, 668–69 (2012).
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following conclusions: First, because joint tenancy creation is
now intent-based, not unities-based, joint tenancy termination
should likewise be intent-based, not unities-destruction-based.
Second, unilateral “stealth” severances of joint tenancies are
contrary to public policy, unless accompanied by effective prior
notice to the other joint tenant or tenants. Third, North Carolina
General Statute section 41-2 requires substantial and
comprehensive revision to further clarify the contemporary law
of joint tenancy in North Carolina. Fourth, substantial
improvement in the law’s transparency is required in the
legislative process if all interested parties, including consumers,
are to have a meaningful opportunity to provide input when
important real property laws are added, revised, or deleted from
the General Statutes.
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INTRODUCTION
Until the 2012 Countrywide decision,2 North Carolina
experienced 228 years with no appellate court decision addressing
traditional joint tenancy law, including the lightning rod issue of
severance. Professor John Orth’s article, The Joint Tenancy Makes a
Comeback in North Carolina,3 chronicles in precise detail the history
of the joint tenancy in North Carolina, including its legislative
abolishment in 17844 and return via a revision of North Carolina
General Statute (“G.S.”) 41-2 effective in 1991.5 While the appellate
courts decided a handful of cases prior to 1990 recognizing and
interpreting contracts for survivorship between cotenants,6 the twoplus century period from 1784 to 1990 is free of traditional joint
tenancy law issues.7 Another twenty-two years passed after the

2. Id.
3. John V. Orth, The Joint Tenancy Makes a Comeback in North Carolina, 69 N.C. L.
REV. 491 (1991).
4. Id. at 493.
5. Id. at 491–92.
6. Id. at 495–97. Professor Orth discusses three of these interim-period contract
cases, Vettori v. Fay, 262 N.C. 481, 137 S.E.2d 810 (1964), Pope v. Burgess, 230 N.C. 323,
53 S.E.2d 159 (1949), and Taylor v. Smith, 116 N.C. 531, 21 S.E. 202 (1895). Orth’s critique
of Vettori v. Fay provides sound reasons why practicing attorneys today should avoid the
contract theory option. See Orth, supra note 3, at 496. See infra note 65, for Professor
Orth’s discussion of the shortcomings of contract-for-survivorship theory.
7. Technically the “joint tenancy” continued to exist, but in a form that eliminated
the survivorship feature. Therefore, with the exception of the “trade and commerce”
provisions in the original statute, the joint tenancy became indistinguishable from a
tenancy in common. See SAMUEL F. MORDECAI, MORDECAI’S LAW LECTURES 602
(1916) (“[A]s far back as 1784, we practically abolished joint tenancy as a beneficial estate
in fee simple . . . .”).
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“reincarnation” of the joint tenancy before the North Carolina Court
of Appeals addressed any issue based on traditional joint tenancy law.
Countrywide and the unfortunate legislative response to that case
notwithstanding,8 the North Carolina history—more aptly “nonhistory”—of traditional joint tenancy law presents a unique,
challenging, and wonderful jurisprudential opportunity for both an
exploration of contemporary joint tenancy theory and a clarification
of creation and severance issues. Two centuries of North Carolina law
devoid of precedent provide a “clean slate” for a fresh consideration
of issues and public policy in a millennium far different from the
medieval roots of the tenancy’s origin.
In this article, we first summarize the North Carolina General
Assembly’s 1991 amendment to the joint tenancy statute, G.S. 41-2,
and the piecemeal amendments to that statute that followed. We then
analyze predictable creation and severance issues. Next, we revisit
Countrywide and what we consider a flawed legislative response to
that decision. Throughout, we advocate an intent-based analysis of
creation and severance issues, an approach that revisits an ongoing,
yet decades-old debate.9 Finally, we compare and contrast the
approach of other jurisdictions to joint tenancy creation and
severance. As part of our discussion of joint tenancy legislation, we
highly recommend the North Carolina General Assembly develop a

8. See discussion infra Part III.
9. See, e.g., R.H. Helmholz, Realism and Formalism in the Severance of Joint
Tenancies, 77 NEB. L. REV. 1, 1–2 n.1 (1998) (citing and summarizing scholarship from the
1950s as follows: “See Paul Basye, Joint Tenancy: A Reappraisal, 30 CAL. ST. B.J. 504, 507
(1955) (describing the four unities of joint tenancy as ‘an outstanding example of
persisting medieval formalism’); Londo H. Brown, Some Aspects of Joint Ownership of
Real Property in West Virginia, 63 W. VA. L. REV. 207, 227 (1961) (stating that the four
unities requirement is ‘outmoded and has no place in modern law’); John Mann, Joint
Tenancies Today, 1956 ILL. L. F. 48, 75 (describing the joint tenancy as ‘a technical
common law estate, full of pitfalls for the unwary and uninformed’); Elmer M. Million et
al., Real and Personal Property, 36 N.Y.U. L. REV. 357, 381 (1961) (noting with approval
the development of an intent-based test according to discussions ‘during the past seven
years’); Frank Reichelderfer, Severance of Joint Interests, 1959 ILL. L. F. 932, 934–35
(showing need for the use of a straw-man to sever); Robert W. Swenson & Ronan E.
Degnan, Severance of Joint Tenancies, 38 MINN. L. REV. 466, 503 (1954) (arguing that the
unities may have had a purpose historically ‘but are useless concepts today’); Leland
Stuart Beck, Note, 41 CORNELL L.Q. 154, 159 (1955) (‘The intention of the parties should
be controlling, and the function of the court is to seek out that intention.’); Note, Effect of
Contract to Sell, 42 IOWA L. REV. 646, 648–49 (1957) (criticizing recent decision as
contrary to the better rule that would ‘hold intention to be the primary test for severance,’
as was true for creation); Edward H. Hoenicke, Comment, Elimination of the Straw Man
in the Creation of Joint Estates in Michigan, 54 MICH. L. REV. 118, 120 (1955); George W.
Marti, Note, 55 MICH. L. REV. 1194, 1195 (1957); Harold J. Romig, Jr. & John M. Shelton,
Comment, Severance of a Joint Tenancy in California, 8 HASTINGS L.J. 290, 298 (1957)”).
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more deliberative and transparent vetting process prior to the
addition or revision of any statute having the effect of making
substantial alterations to the law of real property.
I. THE STATUTES
A. The 1991 Reincarnation of the North Carolina Joint Tenancy
A brief summary of the key statute and subsequent amendments
and revisions to statutes dealing with joint tenancy law in North
Carolina is essential to an understanding of current real property and
public policy issues. Section (a) of G.S. 41-2, the key statute we will
focus on throughout this article, reads as follows as revised and
amended in 1991 and 2009:
(a) Except as otherwise provided herein, in all estates, real or
personal, held in joint tenancy, the part or share of any tenant
dying shall not descend or go to the surviving tenant, but shall
descend or be vested in the heirs, executors, or administrators,
respectively, of the tenant so dying, in the same manner as
estates held by tenancy in common: Provided, that estates held
in joint tenancy for the purpose of carrying on and promoting
trade and commerce, or any useful work or manufacture,
established and pursued with a view of profit to the parties
therein concerned, are vested in the surviving partner, in order
to enable the surviving partner to settle and adjust the
partnership business, or pay off the debts which may have been
contracted in pursuit of the joint business; but as soon as the
same is effected, the survivor shall account with, and pay, and
deliver to the heirs, executors and administrators respectively of
such deceased partner all such part, share, and sums of money
as the deceased partner may be entitled to by virtue of the
original agreement, if any, or according to the deceased
partner’s share or part in the joint concern, in the same manner
as partnership stock is usually settled between joint merchants
and the representatives of their deceased partners. Nothing in
this section prevents the creation of a joint tenancy with right of
survivorship in real or personal property if the instrument
creating the joint tenancy expressly provides for a right of
survivorship, and no other document shall be necessary to
establish said right of survivorship. Upon conveyance to a third
party by less than all of three or more joint tenants holding
property in joint tenancy with right of survivorship, a tenancy in
common is created among the third party and the remaining joint
tenants, who remain joint tenants with right of survivorship as
between themselves. Upon conveyance to a third party by one of
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two joint tenants holding property in joint tenancy with right of
survivorship, a tenancy in common is created between the third
party and the remaining joint tenant. A conveyance of any
interest in real property by a party to one or more other parties,
whether or not jointly with the grantor-party, as joint tenants with
right of survivorship, creates in the parties that interest, if the
instrument of conveyance expressly provides for a joint tenancy
with right of survivorship.10
The General Assembly adopted a regrettable drafting approach
when it reincarnated the joint tenancy with right of survivorship form
of concurrent ownership. Rather than revising the law with a
straightforward new statute drafted from scratch, legislators opted for
an incomplete, confusing patchwork quilt of verbiage, combining a
colonial weaver’s fragment of woolen cloth with a piece of modern
spandex. The original language of 1784 was left in place with the 1991
“reincarnation” language tacked to the end.11 Professor Orth notes
that:
The new statute on joint tenancy comes in the form of an
addition to the current codification of the Act of 1784; that is,
the general rule adopted two centuries ago remains in force, but
a further and very broad exception to it is created. The estate of
joint tenancy is still without the right of survivorship, unless
“the instrument creating the joint tenancy expressly provides
for a right of survivorship.”12
In blunt, non-legal terms, however, the methodology employed
in the 1991 revision might more aptly be termed “duct-tape” drafting.
Picture a layperson, a first-year law student, or even an attorney with
limited exposure to real property law, reading this statute for the first
time. The title to G.S. 41-2 was revised in the reincarnation process to
read, in part: “Survivorship In Joint Tenancy defined; proviso as to
Partnership.”13 The first sentence of the 1991 statute continues to
10. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2(a) (2013) (emphasis added). The 2009 legislation
converted the former statute as amended in 1990 to subsection (a) and added a new
subsection (b) to the statute. See Act of July 10, 2009, ch. 268, § 1, 2009 N.C. Sess. Laws
427, 428 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2(a)).
11. See Orth, supra note 3, at 497.
12. Id. at 497 (citations omitted) (quoting Act of July 12, 1990, ch. 891, § 1, 1989 N.C.
Sess. Laws 224, 225 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2 (2013)). For a
transcription of the 1991 revision of G.S. 41-2, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2(a) and supra
note 10 and accompanying text. Through subsequent amendments, the title to G.S. 41-2
now reads: “Survivorship in joint tenancy defined; proviso as to partnership; unequal
ownership interests.” N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2(a).
13. Act of July 12, 1990, ch. 891, § 1, 1989 N.C. Sess. Laws 224, 224 (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2 (2013)).
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declare that a joint tenancy in North Carolina does not have a
survivorship feature14 but inserts the language “[e]xcept as otherwise
provided herein” at the beginning of that sentence.15 This is followed
by business entity exceptions. The first sentence of the language
tacked on to the end of the original statute in the above-quoted
statute then declares, “[n]othing in this section prevents the creation
of a joint tenancy in real or personal property if the instrument
creating the joint tenancy expressly provides for survivorship.”16
Yes, attorney and law student alike will ultimately make sense
out of the statute, and an astute layperson might also successfully
decipher it. However, most readers will do so only after journeying
through ancient language of little utility to perhaps ninety-five
percent of those seeking guidance on the law of joint tenancy. From
the vantage point of evaluating the quality of the statute, we find little
solace in the fact that a careful reader will eventually arrive at the
relevant sentences tacked to the end by the 1991 revision.17
In what at best can be considered a lukewarm defense of the
revision technique engaged in by the General Assembly during the
1990-91 session, the North Carolina approach to recognizing joint
tenancies mimics that of other jurisdictions.18 In one popular law
school hornbook, for example, the authors summarize this trend as
follows: “In many states there are statutes that do not purport to
abolish joint tenancies, but which provide in substance that a transfer
to two or more persons in their own right shall create a tenancy in
common unless the transferor indicates that the transferees shall take
as joint tenants.”19

14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.; see also supra italicized text accompanying note 10.
17. A precise and comprehensive legislative history of the 1991 amendment to G.S.
41-2 is either non-existent or tremendously difficult to obtain. Locating the applicable
committee minutes involves sifting through thousands of documents located on microfiche
at the North Carolina Legislative Office Building. A June 6, 1989, memorandum from
Rep. Giles Perry, a co-sponsor of H.B. 1067 with Rep. S. Thompson, to the Senate
Judiciary Committee explains that the amendment’s purpose is to “specify that no
document other than the one creating the joint tenancy is needed to establish a right of
survivorship, when it expressly provides for such.” Memorandum from Rep. Giles Perry
(June 6, 1989) (on file with author).
18. See WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 5.3
(3d ed. 2000) (citing various state statutes, including: “Ark. Stat. § 50-411; Md. Code Real
Property, § 2-117; 60 Okla. Stat. Ann. § 74; Official Code Ga. Ann. § 85-1002; Mass. Gen.
L. Ann. Ch. 184 § 7 (1977); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 58-501; Ohio Rev. Code §§ 5202.20, 5302.17;
Va. Code 1950, §§ 55-20, 55-21”).
19. Id. § 5.3, at 185.
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By this point, the reader is probably thinking: “Tell me what you
really think about the 1991 revision to G.S. 41-2.” But the familiar
sales pitch in late-night commercials—“but wait, there’s more”—is
our best response, for even the title utilized in the 1991 revision is an
incomplete and, in part, a misleading patch job. The language
preceding the proviso as to partnership property was changed from
“Survivorship In Joint Tenancy Abolished” to “Survivorship In Joint
Tenancy Defined.”20 This title simply does not accurately disclose a
significant reform of the North Carolina law of concurrent ownership.
B.

Elimination of Three of the Four Common Law Unities

A series of helpful post-1991 amendments to G.S. 41-2
transformed the traditional joint tenancy into conformity with
contemporary law and practice of many jurisdictions. As the
legislative dust settles, three of the four traditional joint tenancy
unities are no longer required for creation, leaving only unity of
possession remaining as an attribute of the joint tenancy. The
continuing requirement of unity of possession is an insignificant one.
This is the case because, under traditional joint tenancy law, actual
possession by each joint tenant is not required,21 and joint tenants
have always enjoyed the flexibility to modify rights of possession and
use without jeopardizing the unity of possession requirement.22
The unities of time and title, common law requirements that the
joint tenancy be created at the same time and by the same
instrument,23 were eliminated effective July 10, 2009,24 leaving strawmen and straw-women unemployed throughout the state.25 The

20. Act of July 12, 1990, ch. 891, § 1, 1989 N.C. Sess. Laws 224, 224 (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2 (2013)).
21. See SHELDON F. KURTZ, MOYNIHAN’S INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL
PROPERTY 274 n.2 (4th ed. 2005) (citing 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*180).
22. See, e.g., Hammond v. McArthur, 183 P.2d 1, 3 (Cal. 1947) (noting that joint
tenants are able to modify the right of equal possession and use, but these modifications
are not inconsistent with unity of possession). Some jurisdictions have eliminated all four
unities. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 500.19(3) (West 2014) (“The common law
requirement for unity of time, title, interest, and possession for the creation of a joint
tenancy is abolished.”).
23. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 18, § 5.3, at 183.
24. See Act of July 10, 2009, ch. 268, § 1, 2009 N.C. Sess. Laws 427, 428 (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2(a) (2013)). The elimination of the need for a
“strawperson” fulfilled Professor Orth’s final suggestion in his article. See Orth, supra note
3, at 500.
25. G.S. 41-2, however, does not expressly deal with whether severance of a joint
tenancy can take place by execution of a deed by a grantor-joint tenant to herself as a
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amendment included a curative provision saving conveyances prior to
its enactment that had not followed the proper straw-conveyance
procedure.26 Unity of interest was also jettisoned in 2009;27 G.S. 412(b) now reads, in part:
(b) The interests of the grantees holding property in joint
tenancy with right of survivorship shall be deemed to be equal
unless otherwise specified in the conveyance. Any joint tenancy
interest held by a husband and wife, unless otherwise specified,
shall be deemed to be held as a single tenancy by the entirety,
which shall be treated as a single party when determining
interests in the joint tenancy with right of survivorship. If joint
tenancy interests among three or more joint tenants holding
property in joint tenancy with right of survivorship are held in
unequal shares, upon the death of one joint tenant, the share of
the deceased joint tenant shall be divided among the surviving
joint tenants according to their respective pro rata interest and
not equally, unless the creating instrument provides otherwise.28
As with the prior amendment eliminating the unities of time and
title, the elimination of unity of interest included a necessary curative
provision.29 Inquiries to Professor Hetrick prior to the amendment of
tenant in common. See infra text accompanying notes 106–13, dealing with whether
unilateral severance by one joint tenant is effective by a direct conveyance to herself.
26. The last sentence of G.S. 41-2(a) was amended in 1991 to read: “A conveyance of
any interest in real property by a party to himself and one or more other parties, as joint
tenants with right of survivorship, creates in the parties that interest, if the instrument of
conveyance expressly provides for a joint tenancy with right of survivorship.” Act of July
9, 1991, ch. 606, § 1, 1991 N.C. Sess. Laws 1338, 1338 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 41-2 (2013)). Gender-neutral changes were made to the last sentence of subsection
(a) in 2009, and that sentence now reads: “A conveyance of any interest in real property
by a party to one or more other parties, whether or not jointly with the grantor-party, as
joint tenants with right of survivorship, creates in the parties that interest, if the instrument
of conveyance expressly provides for survivorship.” Act of July 10, 2009, ch. 268, § 1, 2009
N.C. Sess. Laws 427, 428 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2 (2013)).
27. Act of July 10, 2009, ch. 268, § 1, 2009 N.C. Sess. Laws 427 (titled “An Act To
Clarify That Interests In A Joint Tenancy With A Right Of Survivorship May Be Held In
Unequal Shares”). In reality, this legislation reflects a major substantive change to the law
of joint tenancy, not a mere clarification.
28. Id. The title to G.S. 41-2 now reads: “Survivorship in joint tenancy defined;
proviso as to partnership; unequal ownership interests.” N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2 (2013).
29. The last paragraph of G.S. 41-2(b) now reads:
This subsection shall apply to any conveyance of an interest in property created at
any time that explicitly sought to create unequal ownership interests in a joint
tenancy with right of survivorship. Distributions made prior to the enactment of
this subsection that were made in equal amounts from a joint tenancy with right of
survivorship that sought to create unequal ownership shares shall remain valid and
shall not be subject to modification on the basis of this section.
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G.S. 41-2 to eliminate the unity of interest requirement reveal that
attorneys were considering the creation of joint tenancies with
unequal interests to serve the practical needs of their clients.30 A
classic principle of statutory construction dictates that the express
earlier elimination of two unities—time and title—left the remaining
common law unities of interest and possession in place.31 As with the
earlier amendment eliminating time and title, the amendment’s
retroactive “cure” was deemed necessary due to the perceived needs
of clients and the erroneous assumption among some members of the
bar that a joint tenancy could be legally created in North Carolina
with unequal interests. In any event, the takeaway is a very positive
one: the amendment eliminating unity of interest provides clientcentered flexibility to the law of joint tenancy.32
In 2012, additional amendments became necessary to correct an
oversight in the revision of G.S. 41-2 that ignored the ripple effect of
recognizing unequal ownership interests in joint tenancies on the
Simultaneous Death Act.33 Last but not least, the General Assembly
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2(b).
30. During 2007 and 2008, Professor Hetrick received numerous phone calls from
attorneys describing fact situations in which deeds creating joint tenancies with unequal
interests were being considered.
31. By omitting only the unities of time and title, the General Assembly left the
remaining unities of interest and possession in place, invoking the doctrine of expessio
unius est exclusio alterius. See, e.g., Evans v. Diaz, 333 N.C. 774, 779–80, 430 S.E.2d 244,
247 (1993) (“Under the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusion alterius, when a statute
lists the situations to which it applies, it implies the exclusion of situations not contained in
the list.”).
32. See, e.g., Routhier v. Twp. of Clark, No. 450599, 2014 WL 2781729, at *1–2 (Mich.
Tax Trib. May 6, 2014) (discussing a property tax dispute in which the grantor had
conveyed by quitclaim deed a one percent interest to his son and a ninety-nine percent
interest to himself, “all parties as joint tenant with full rights of survivorship”). Other
jurisdictions cling to the “unity of interest” requirement. See, e.g., Walsh v. Reynolds, 335
P.3d 984, 995 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014) (finding that same-sex domestic partners owned
property as tenants in common rather than as joint tenants where unity of interest was
lacking).
33. See Act of Oct. 1, 2012, ch. 69, § 1, 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws 230 (codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 28A-24-3 (2013)). The necessary revision eliminated the prior rule under the
Simultaneous Death Act that property passed in the event of a simultaneous death “[to]
each of the co-owners in the proportion that one bears to the whole number of coowners,”Act of June 27, 2007, ch. 132, § 1, 2007 N.C. Sess. Laws 222–223 (codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 28A-24-3 (2013)), and replaced it with the following:
Except as otherwise provided in this Article:
(1) If there are two or more co-owners with right of survivorship and it is not
established by clear and convincing evidence that at least one of them survived the
other or others by at least 120 hours, then, unless the governing instrument
provides otherwise, each co-owner’s pro rata interest in the property passes as if
that co-owner had survived all other co-owners by at least 120 hours.
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effectively reversed the court of appeals decision in Countrywide “and
more” effective July 1, 2013, by adding subsection (a1) to G.S. 41-2.34
Throughout this article, we presume that a North Carolina joint
tenancy is now an intent-based form of concurrent ownership. Both
Professor Orth35 and other leading real property experts36 opine that
the emphasis in statutory interpretation should be on language
sufficient to indicate an intent to create a joint tenancy. While three
of the four traditional common law unities are no longer necessary,
some or all will likely continue to be present in many conveyances.
The continued existence of unities, however, should not preclude an
intent-based framework of analysis on both creation and severance
issues.37 In short, the archaic common law focus on unities is
inconsistent with contemporary joint tenancy jurisprudence.
Historically, unities-based theories of creation and severance tended
to be intent defeating, too often a trap for laypersons and attorneys
alike. Indeed, we propose that even the continuing use of the word
“severance” is inaccurate; instead, the term “termination” more
precisely conveys the idea that one joint tenant either expressly or
impliedly intends to end the joint tenancy with its survivorship feature
and convert it into a tenancy in common. We will, however, continue
to use the term “severance” because so many appellate courts
uniformly do so.

(2) If there are two or more co-owners with right of survivorship and it is
established by clear and convincing evidence that at least one of them survived the
other or others by at least 120 hours, then, unless the governing instrument
provides otherwise, the pro rata interest or interests of the deceased owner or
owners who are not established by clear and convincing evidence to have survived
by at least 120 hours passes to (i) the remaining owner if only one or (ii) if more
than one, then to those remaining owners according to the pro rata interest of
each.
Act of Oct. 1, 2012, ch. 69, § 1, 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws 230 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 28A-24-3 (2013)).
34. See Act of June 26, 2013, ch. 204, § 1.11, 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 577 (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2(a1) (2013)) (discussed infra Section III.A).
35. See Orth, supra note 3, at 498 (“[R]eliance must be placed on courts interpreting
the statute to recognize that what must be express is the intention to create the right of
survivorship, not some set verbal formula.”).
36. See STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 18, § 5.3, at 185 (“Even where the
statutory language is rather restrictive, it is generally unnecessary to use the exact words
contained in the statute in order to indicate the intent to create a joint tenancy.”).
37. Compare Helmholz, supra note 9, at 1–2 n.1, with prior articles summarized
therein. The tension between formalism and intent in joint tenancy law deserves
reexamination in light of the relatively recent elimination of three of the four unities in
North Carolina and many other jurisdictions.
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One relic of colonial American property law particularly
deserving of the jurisprudential dumpster is the categorization of joint
tenancy as an “odious” form of concurrent ownership.38 While the
tenancy in common remains the safe, default category of concurrent
ownership—absent a clear intent to the contrary—the joint tenancy is
far from “odious,”39 and instead, enjoys considerable contemporary
utilitarian value as a flexible method of creating a survivorship
feature.40 While the original common law rule favoring joint tenancies
ended with feudalism, and the colonial distaste for joint tenancies was
understandably based on their medieval role in preserving aristocratic
forms of land ownership,41 no compelling modern rationale exists for
an appellate court to bend over backwards to avoid finding a joint
tenancy. All that should be necessary today is clear intent to create a
joint tenancy regardless of the particular verbiage employed.
C.

Shortcomings of the Revised North Carolina Joint Tenancy
Statutes

Two overarching issues—creation and severance—dominate
joint tenancy controversies in other jurisdictions. Because joint
tenancies will continue to be created by a few words in a conveyance
or devise,42 the outcome of most foreseeable issues will be determined

38. See, e.g., Blodogett v. Union & New Haven Trust Co., 149 A. 790, 793 (Conn.
1930) (“Our own court from an early day has looked with disfavor upon the common law
joint tenancy with its ‘odious and unjust doctrine of survivorship.’ But that has not
prevented our recognition of the right in this jurisdiction to create estates of this nature by
will, or deed, or other instrument, when the intention to so create is clear and definite.”);
Davidson v. Heydon, 2 Yeates 459, 460 (Pa. 1799); Galbraith v. Galbraith, 3 Serg. &
Rawle 392, 393 (Pa. 1817) (explaining that the tenancy in common is favored because “a
joint-tenancy is odious; and the principles of the feudal system from which it originated
are foreign to the feelings and civil institutions of Pennsylvania”); Fawver v. Fawver, 47
Va. (6 Gratt.) 236 (Va. 1849).
39. The Oxford Dictionary defines “odious” as “extremely unpleasant; repulsive.”
Odius, OXFORD DICTIONARY, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american
_english/odious (last visited Aug. 17, 2015).
40. See JOHN G. SPRANKLING, PROPERTY LAW § 10.02 [B][4], at 134 (3d ed. 2007)
(noting that the joint tenancy has been extensively used in recent years as a tool to avoid
the cost and delay of probate proceedings).
41. Statutes ending the common law presumption of a joint tenancy enacted soon
after the American Revolution were based on identification of the joint tenancy as a
remnant of feudalism. See 2 H. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 424, at 206 n.47
(B. Jones ed., 3d ed. 1939).
42. See, e.g., John W. Fisher, II, Creditors of a Joint Tenant: Is There a Lien After
Death?, 99 W. VA. L. REV. 637, 638 (1997) (noting that because co-tenancies are created
by a few words in a conveyance or devise, “the legal relationship between cotenants is
determined from the common law court decisions and statutory provisions and not the
language of the creating instrument”).
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by appellate court decisions without statutory guidance. Concerning
creation and severance issues, the 1991 and subsequent amendments
to G.S. 41-2 are helpful but incomplete. In the following subsections
of this article, we transition from a general analysis of G.S. 41-2 to an
examination and critique of predictable joint tenancy creation and
severance issues.
1. Predictable Creation Issues
G.S. 41-2 addresses creation of a joint tenancy as follows:
“Nothing in this section prevents the creation of a joint tenancy with
right of survivorship in real or personal property if the instrument
creating the joint tenancy expressly provides for a right of
survivorship, and no other document shall be necessary to establish
said right of survivorship.”43
Examples of predictable creation language:
Example 1.
O conveys “to A & B as joint tenants with right
of survivorship.” Clearly, this precise language creates a joint tenancy
under the above-quoted statutory language. Experienced real estate
attorneys will cling to this simple formula for success.
Example 2.
O conveys “to A & B as joint tenants and not as
tenants in common.” Historically, lawyers in other jurisdictions might
adopt this language to create a joint tenancy. Professor Orth opines
that this language will pass muster,44 and we concur. By eliminating
the tenancy in common, the only form of concurrent ownership
without a survivorship feature, the language indirectly, but expressly,
provides for survivorship.45 While no North Carolina appellate court

43. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2(a) (2013).
44. Orth, supra note 3, at 498 (“A carefully drafted instrument will closely follow the
words of the statute, describing the grantees as holding ‘as joint tenants with right of
survivorship,’ or even ‘as joint tenants with right of survivorship and not as tenants in
common.’ Such wording would undoubtedly accomplish its purpose. But not all drafting is
equally careful: the right of a survivor may be referred to without expressly using the
phrase ‘right of survivorship.’ In Vettori, for example, where a right of survivorship was
found to have been created by contract, those specific words were not used. The grantees
were described as only holding ‘as joint tenants’ and reference was made as well to ‘the
heirs and assigns of the survivor.’ Reliance must be placed on courts interpreting the
statute to recognize that what must be expressed is the intention to create the right of
survivorship, not some set verbal formula.”).
45. See infra Example 8 where the possibility of a “tenancy in common with right of
survivorship” is discussed. The traditional tenancy in common, however, has no right of
survivorship.
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has interpreted this language, other jurisdictions appropriately reach
the joint tenancy result.46
Example 3.
O conveys “to A & B as joint tenants.” Without
a doubt, this language, standing alone, will unfortunately occur,
particularly when laypersons surf the web for guidance on do-ityourself drafting of important legal documents. Absent other
language in the conveyance, the current joint tenancy creation
requirements of G.S. 41-2 are not precisely satisfied. At a minimum,
this incomplete language will likely result in a dispute and possible
litigation on the creation issue.47
Example 4.
O conveys “to A & B jointly with right of
survivorship.” Used in isolation, the word “jointly” has always been
suspect because the joint tenancy form of concurrent ownership is
traditionally not favored.48 In this example, however, the word
“jointly” is not used in isolation, and the addition of the words “with
right of survivorship” should be sufficient to create a joint tenancy in
North Carolina. The language might validly be selected because it
appears in other North Carolina statutes.49 G.S. 30-3.2(3f)(c) equates
the term “jointly with right of survivorship” with “joint tenants with
right of survivorship,” appearing to use the former term as a generic
version of the latter. The sub-subsection reads as follows:
Property held as tenants by the entirety or jointly with right of
survivorship as follows:
46. See, e.g., 4 GEORGE W. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF
REAL PROPERTY § 1775, at 10 (Replacement Vol. 1979) [hereinafter COMMENTARIES ON
THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY] (citing two Illinois Supreme Court decisions,
Dolley v. Powers, 89 N.E.2d 412 (Ill. 1949) and Klouda v. Pechousek, 110 N.E.2d 258 (Ill.
1953)).
47. The possibility of reformation, of course, exists, although any language that results
in what can be costly litigation is per se inadequate. However, beware of those inevitable
deed interpretation disputes where additional, arguably contradictory language is added.
See, e.g., Spresser v. Langmade, 427 P.2d 478, 480 (Kan. 1967) (describing grantees in the
introductory clause of a deed as “joint tenants with the right of survivorship and not as
tenants in common,” but the granting and habendum clauses included the language “unto
said parties of the second part, their heirs, successors and assigns, forever”). The Kansas
Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s conclusion that a tenancy in common was created
and found that the “clearest type of language” was used to show an intent to create a joint
tenancy with right of survivorship. Id.
48. See COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, supra note 46,
§ 1775, at 11–12.
49. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-3.2(3f)(b) (2013). The “definitions” section of
Article 1A, “Elective Share,” reads, in part, as follows: “Property over which the
decedent, immediately before death, held a presently exercisable general power of
appointment, except for (i) property held jointly with right of survivorship which is
includable in total assets only to the extent provided in sub-subdivision c. of this
subdivision . . . .”Id. (emphasis added).
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1. One-half of any property held by the decedent and the
surviving spouse as tenants by the entirety or as joint tenants
with right of survivorship is included, without regard to who
contributed the property.
2. Property held by the decedent and one or more other persons
other than the surviving spouse as joint tenants with right of
survivorship is included to the following extent:
I. All property attributable to the decedent’s contribution.
II. The decedent’s pro rata share of property not attributable to
the decedent’s contribution, except to the extent of property
attributable to contributions by a surviving joint tenant.
The decedent is presumed to have contributed the jointly
owned property unless contribution by another is proven by
clear and convincing evidence.50
It is clear that the “property held” language in the introduction
of the sub-subsection is referring to real property, and the language
“jointly with right of survivorship” is used interchangeably with the
language “joint tenants with right of survivorship.”
A potential dispute could involve a conveyance to a third person
by one party intending to sever the purported joint tenancy, with the
other party asserting that joint life estates with a contingent
remainder to the survivor were created, not a true joint tenancy with
right of survivorship.
Example 5.
O conveys “to A & B for their joint lives with
right of survivorship.”51 Does this language create a joint tenancy with
right of survivorship, or a materially different combination of present
estates for life with contingent remainder in fee simple absolute to the
survivor? The label we place on this conveyance matters under both
the law of partition and severance. While a joint life estate can be
partitioned,52 the contingent remainders are indestructible and not
subject to partition absent an agreement by both A & B.53 Although a
deed of trust executed by only A or B will convey both the grantor’s
50. Id.
51. If the intention of the grantor is to create joint life estates with contingent
remainder to the survivor, use of the term “contingent remainder” will reinforce the fact
that a joint tenancy with right of survivorship is not intended. Perhaps this is overkill, but
to remove all doubt, a statement in the conveyance as follows will suffice: “It is not the
grantor’s intent in this conveyance to create a joint tenancy.”
52. Ray v. Poole, 187 N.C. 749, 752, 123 S.E. 5, 6–7 (1924).
53. Id. at 752, 123 S.E. at 6; see also COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF
REAL PROPERTY, supra note 46, § 1775, at 13 (noting that life estates with cross
remainders “cannot be defeated by deed or will of one of the life co-tenants”).
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joint life estate and contingent remainder, it will not survive the death
of a predeceasing mortgagor. G.S. 41-2(a1), the legislative response to
Countrywide, is clearly inapplicable.54
Example 6.
O conveys “to A & B with right of
survivorship.” This inadequate language is neither fish nor fowl. It
expressly provides for survivorship without using the important words
“as joint tenants,” and alludes to a possible future interest without
using the words “remainder” or “contingent remainder.” Without
more, the words appear to point to a joint tenancy with right of
survivorship, the closest form of concurrent ownership that fulfills the
grantor’s probable intent.55 This is the case because a fee simple is
presumed and the words “life estate” or “joint lives” are absent. In
addition, it would be inappropriate for a court to overemphasize the
modern preference for a tenancy in common in a fact situation where
the grantor clearly intended a survivorship feature.
Example 7.
O conveys “to A & B jointly.” One leading
treatise reaffirms the traditional preference for the tenancy in
common default rule56 while one contemporary hornbook author
opines that this language “may be insufficient” to create a joint
tenancy.57 As with many of these creation examples, the words
featured often occur with other language. The word “jointly,” for
example, is sometimes combined with “jointly and severally,”
compounding the confusion.58
Example 8.
O conveys “to A & B as tenants in common
with right of survivorship.” Oh, the web we spin! This language may

54. G.S. 41-2(a1), the legislative response to Countrywide, is strictly limited to the
“joint tenancy” form of real property ownership. Specifically, it deals with the issue of
whether a deed of trust executed by a joint tenant “severs” the joint tenancy. A
conveyance “to A & B for their joint lives with right of survivorship” is not a joint tenancy;
rather, it is a combination of present and future interests in real property. Therefore, any
issue of “severance” of a joint tenancy is completely inapplicable.
55. G.S. 30-3.2(3f)(c), discussed with Example 4, supra, also lends credence to this
interpretation. See also COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY,
supra note 46, § 1775, at 11 n.15 (“Conveyance to A and B and their heirs with right of
survivorship did not militate against a joint tenancy since heirs were words of limitation.”)
(citing Spresser v. Langmade, 427 P.2d 478, 480 (Kan. 1967) (holding a conveyance “to A
& B and their heirs with right of survivorship did not militate against a joint tenancy since
heirs were words of limitation”).
56. See COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, supra note 46,
§ 1775, at 13 (citing In re Ungara’s Estate, 51 N.Y.S.2d 386, 388 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1944),
superseded by statute, N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 6-2.2 (McKinney 1998)
(“jointly” does not overcome the statutory presumption of a tenancy in common)).
57. See SPRANKLING, supra note 40, § 10.02[2], at 133.
58. See id. (citing James v. Taylor, 969 S.W.2d 672, 675 (Ark. Ct. App. 1998) (finding a
tenancy in common)).
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effectively create a right of survivorship, but what title do we place on
this conveyance? After all, the hallmark of a common law tenancy in
common is the lack of a right of survivorship.59 Stoebuck and
Whitman summarize the law, in part, as follows:
Although survivorship is not an incident of tenancies in
common, many cases assert that the right of survivorship may
be annexed to a tenancy in common if the instrument creating
the tenancy in common so provides. This means, apparently,
that an instrument containing an express provision for
survivorship will be held to create a tenancy in common for the
lives of the cotenants, with a contingent remainder (usually in
fee simple) in favor of the surviving cotenant.60
Thompson on Property, the venerable treatise on real property
law, explains that “[i]n a tenancy in common with right of
survivorship, the survivor takes by virtue of the contract created by
the express language of the instrument . . . .”61 The author adds that
survivorship “arises by virtue of the agreement of the parties and not
as an incident of the property law.”62
The Thompson treatise goes on to explain that use of this form of
conveyance is attributed to “a counter current endeavoring to revive
the survivorship result” in jurisdictions that prohibited the tenancy by
the entireties and joint tenancy.63 The explanation fits those
intervening North Carolina appellate court decisions recognizing and
enforcing contracts for survivorship between cotenants,64 although
Professor Orth understandably sees contract theory as both raising

59. Id. § 10.02[1], at 131. (“Tenants in common do not have a right of survivorship,
unlike joint tenants or tenants by the entirety.”).
60. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 18, § 5.2, at 180 (citing Pope v. Burgess, 230
N.C. 323, 325, 53 S.E.2d 159, 160 (1949) and COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF
REAL PROPERTY, supra note 46, § 1793, at 140 n.36, § 1796, at 149 (including section 1796
of COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, which is titled “Tenancy
in common with right of survivorship”)).
61. COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, supra note 46,
§ 1796, at 149.
62. Id.
63. Id. § 1796, at 148; see also id. § 1775, at 13 n.24 (citing Halleck v. Halleck, 337 P.2d
330 (Or. 1959) (recognizing the use of a joint tenancy in Oregon at a time when a joint
tenancy could not be created and holding that “a tenancy in common with right of
survivorship can be created through the medium of increment life estates with cross
indestructible remainders”)).
64. See Orth, supra note 3, at 495–97 (discussing the three North Carolina contract
cases Taylor v. Smith, Vettori v. Fay, and Pope v. Burgess).
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“several disturbing questions” and being inconsistently applied by the
courts.65
Current use of the language “to A & B as tenants in common
with right of survivorship,” however, can predictably produce
confusion now that North Carolina recognizes the joint tenancy with
right of survivorship. Does this language now create nothing but a
joint tenancy in tenancy-in-common clothing? Or, does it result in a
contract for survivorship that eliminates the possibility of unilateral
severance by one cotenant? Had this language been utilized in
Countrywide, what result?66
Example 9. O conveys to unmarried grantees “as tenants by the
entirety.” Does this transfer create a joint tenancy or a tenancy by the
entirety? In a recent Indiana appellate court decision, for example, a
father conveyed real property to his two sons “as tenants by the
entireties.”67 When one son predeceased the other, his estate
commenced a declaratory judgment action seeking a ruling that the
sons held title as tenants in common. The Indiana Court of Appeals
held that the grantor’s use of the term “tenants by the entirety”
evidenced a sufficient intent to convey a right of survivorship.68 While
a conveyance to two brothers as tenants by the entirety will hopefully
be a rare fact situation, conveyances to purportedly married couples
who, in fact, are not legally married are predictable.69

65. Id. at 496–97 (noting that worries about the enforceability of contracts for
survivorship may have been one of the reasons for passage of the statute recognizing
traditional joint tenancies).
66. These are matters reserved for our discussion of “severance.” See infra Section
IV.B. As a bit of dramatic foreshadowing, however, we ask: Is G.S. 41-2(a1), dealing with
a deed of trust executed by one “joint tenant,” applicable at all to a “tenancy in common
with right of survivorship?”
67. Powell v. Powell, 14 N.E.3d 46, 47 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). The deed was drafted by
the grantor’s legal counsel. Id. at 50.
68. Id. The relevant statute presumes a tenancy in common unless “the intent to
create an estate in joint tenancy manifestly appears from the tenor of the instrument.” Id.
at 48 (quoting IND. CODE ANN. § 32-17-2-1(c) (West 2014)).
69. In its opinion, the Court of Appeals of Indiana cites the following cases from
other jurisdictions as having addressed similar situations where a conveyance to unmarried
couples as “tenants by the entirety” results in a joint tenancy with right of survivorship:
Coleman v. Jackson, 286 F.2d 98, 99–102 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (conveyance to putative
husband and wife as “tenants by the entirety” creates a joint tenancy); Wood v. Wood, 571
S.W.2d 84, 85–86 (Ark. 1978) (conveyance to a putative husband and wife as “tenants by
the entirety” where the husband was already married to another results in a joint tenancy
with right of survivorship); Sams v. McDonald, 160 S.E.2d 594, 595 (Ga. Ct. App. 1968)
(membership in a savings and loan association granted as tenants by the entireties results
in joint tenancy with right of survivorship); Powell v. Powell, 14 N.E.3d 46, 50–51 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2014); Morris v. McCarty, 32 N.E. 938, 938–39 (Mass. 1893) (conveyance to putative
husband and wife as “tenants by the entirety, and not as tenants in common” results in a
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Example 10. Conveyances to married same-sex couples. Consider
the following examples of conveyances to a same-sex married couple.
O conveys:
a)

“to A & B.”

b)

“to A & B as tenants by the entirety.”

c)

“to A & B, a married couple.”

Prior to the recognition of the right of same-sex couples to
legally marry in the June 15, 2015, landmark United States Supreme
Court decision of Obergefell v. Hodges70 and the Bostic v. Schaefer71
decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,
Example 10 a) clearly results in a tenancy in common; Example 10 b)
raises the same issues discussed in Example 9, above, and; Example
10 c) results in a tenancy in common. By both case law72 and statute,73
a conveyance or devise of real property in North Carolina “to a
husband and wife” creates a tenancy by the entirety absent clear
intent to the contrary. Following the recognition of same-sex
marriages in North Carolina, the result should be the creation of a
tenancy by the entirety under the same circumstances; if same-sex
married partners do not enjoy property rights equal to opposite-sex
married partners, serious constitutional issues are triggered.74
joint tenancy with right of survivorship); Mitchell v. Frederick, 170 A. 733, 734–37 (Md.
1934) (conveyance to putative husband and wife in an invalid second marriage “by the
entirety” results in a joint tenancy with right of survivorship); and McManus v. Summers,
430 A.2d 80, 81–84, 87 (Md. 1981) (conveyance to a couple as “tenants by the entirety”
created a joint tenancy with right of survivorship assuming that the husband’s divorce
from his first wife was not valid).
70. 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015) (stating that the right to marry is a fundamental one
and that same-sex couples may not be deprived of that right and liberty under the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment).
71. 760 F.3d 352, 376 (4th Cir. 2014) (finding the right of same-sex couples to marry as
a fundamental human right protected by the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of
the Fourteenth Amendment).
72. See, e.g., Freeze v. Congleton, 276 N.C. 178, 181, 171 S.E.2d 424, 426 (1970) (“A
title conveying real estate to a husband and his wife, nothing else appearing, creates an
estate by the entireties.”).
73. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-13.6(b) (2013) (“A conveyance of real property, or any
interest therein, to a husband and wife vests title in them as tenants by the entirety when
the conveyance is to: (1) A named man ‘and wife,’ or (2) A named woman ‘and husband,’
or (3) Two named persons, whether or not identified in the conveyance as husband and
wife, if at the time of the conveyance they are legally married; unless a contrary intention
is expressed in the conveyance.”).
74. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602 (“Under the Constitution, same-sex couples seek in
marriage the same legal treatment as opposite-sex couples, and it would disparage their
choices and diminish their personhood to deny them this right.”). See, e.g., State v.
Schmidt, 323 P.3d 647, 669 (Alaska 2014) (holding that a property tax exemption program
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Therefore, the recognition of same-sex marriages requires an
extensive review and revision of all General Statutes dealing with
tenancies by the entirety. As of this writing, they are not genderneutral. Prompt revisions to these statutes are crucial to accord samesex couples all traditional benefits of the tenancy by the entirety.75
We conclude, with all due deference to the drafters of the 1991
statutory language, that the effort to bring the traditional joint
tenancy out of moth balls after two centuries was both cursory and
incomplete. Of course, skilled real estate practitioners know how to
create a joint tenancy; laypersons relying on web-based information
and less-skilled lawyers—if other jurisdictions are any indication—fall
short on regular occasions. We will recommend that, in light of
contemporary public policies we will detail later in this article, a more
complete, precise, and clear statute be enacted to replace G.S. 41-2.
2. Predictable Severance Issues
As most law school graduates will recall from their first-year
property law course, “severance” is a frequent and troublesome issue
in joint tenancy law. Curiously, one of the pieces of guidance
provided by the 1991 version of G.S. 41-2—what is known in
academic circles as “severance pro tanto”—provides guidance on an
area where the law in all jurisdictions is clear.76 In relevant part, the
statute provides:
Upon conveyance to a third party by less than all of three or
more joint tenants holding property in joint tenancy with right
of survivorship, a tenancy in common is created among the
third party and the remaining joint tenants, who remain joint
tenants with right of survivorship as between themselves. Upon
conveyance to a third party by one of two joint tenants holding
property in joint tenancy with right of survivorship, a tenancy in
common is created between the third party and the remaining
joint tenant.77

violates the Equal Protection Clause where it facially discriminates between same-sex and
opposite-sex married couples).
75. By the date of publication of this article, our hope is that key statutes will be
revised as we suggest. A full discussion of this issue and the need of urgent statutory
reform is beyond the scope of this article.
76. See Marci v. Swiers, 905 N.Y.S.2d 871, 878 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010) (holding joint
tenant’s conveyance of his one-third interest to his brother vested the brother with a onethird interest as tenant in common with the remaining two joint tenants who continued to
hold the two-third undivided interest as joint tenants).
77. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2 (2013).
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Despite the likelihood of future legal disputes over severance,
the 1991 version of the statute and later iterations unfortunately
sidestep potential severance scenarios. As a practical matter,
additional revisions to G.S. 41-2 therefore remain necessary to guide
attorneys and laypersons alike on foreseeable future severance issues.
At the same time, some predictable severance issues present close
questions of intent and are therefore better anticipated by effective,
preventive legal planning and drafting. Below, we discuss our views
on the appropriateness of a legislative or preventive legal approach to
likely severance controversies. We also consider whether an intentbased or traditional unities-based approach to severance (termination
of the survivorship feature of a joint tenancy) best serves public policy
and practical considerations of preventive law. Most basic law school
hornbooks and appellate cases summarize predictable severance
issues as follows:
a) Whether a lease by one joint tenant severs. This issue has been
aptly described as “like a comet in our law: though its existence in
theory has been frequently recognized, its observed passages are
few.”78 Stoebuck and Whitman observe:
[O]ne joint tenant may, of course, lease his own undivided
interest. Whether such a lease will effect a severance has,
however, been a subject of controversy since the time of
Littleton and Coke. . . . In the United States there is little
authority on the point, and two fairly recent cases reached
opposite results as to the effect of a lease given by one joint
tenant. In the case holding that such a lease does not sever the
joint tenancy, the death of the lessor during the lease term
necessarily terminated the lease and gave the surviving joint
tenant the immediate right to possession.79

78. Tenhet v. Boswell, 554 P.2d 330, 334–35 (Cal. 1976) (en banc).
79. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 18, at 190. The two case notes by Stoebuck
and Whitman were Tenhet v. Boswell and Alexander v. Boyer. In Tenhet, the court found
“neither temporary nor permanent severance; when [the] lessor died, [the] lease
terminated and lessee’s interest also terminated.” Id.; see also Tenhet, 554 P.2d at 332. The
court in Alexander found “joint tenancy [was] severed.” STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra
note 18, at 190; see also Alexander v. Boyer, 253 A.2d 359, 366 (Md. 1969); JOSEPH
WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY 352–53 (3d ed. 2010) (citing 7 RICHARD R. POWELL,
POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 51.04[1][b], at 51-20 (Michael Allan Wolf ed., 2000)
(summarizing Tenhet, including the arguments both in favor of severing the joint tenancy
and also for keeping the joint tenancy, while stating the approach in Tenhet appears to be
the modern trend in most jurisdictions when faced with the question)); SPRANKLING,
supra note 40, § 10.04[A][2], at 144–45 (concurring that the issue has rarely been addressed
by any courts in the United States, but arguing that jurisdictions seem roughly equally split
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While an intent-based approach to severance is more in line with
contemporary thinking than a unities-based approach, it is still of
little help in analyzing this issue. The answer is best left to preventive
law in lease drafting under these circumstances: First, will this transfer
by one joint tenant be a prudent one? Second, assuming the joint
tenant nonetheless desires to lease only his or her interest, does that
joint tenant intend to terminate the survivorship feature of the joint
tenancy by executing the lease? If the answer to the second question
is affirmative, then a provision in the lease precisely setting forth the
intent of the grantor should be sufficient.80 While a lease by one joint
tenant may or may not sever a joint tenancy, a purported lease of the
entire fee simple estate by one—without joinder or ratification by the
others—is completely ineffective to give the lessee exclusive right of
possession and transfers only the lessor’s undivided interest. Another
possibility, of course, is the execution of a lease by all joint tenants.
Our next example addresses that scenario.
b) Whether a lease given by all joint tenants severs. Based on clear
landlord and tenant law, the survivorship interests of all joint tenants
remain subject to the lease upon the death of one joint tenant; i.e., a
valid lease for a definite period of time, traditionally called a “tenancy
for years,” survives the death of a lessor. The existence of two or
more concurrent owners who have executed a lease does not alter
that result.
Calling this scenario a “severance pro tanto” may be an accurate
description. However, bypassing the severance issue entirely and
instead applying both common sense and traditional landlord and
tenant law provides a better framework for analysis. If all joint
tenants execute a lease, it might be prudent once again for their
attorney to address the potential severance issue and insert a
provision in the lease either severing or not severing the joint tenancy
(subject to the lease term in either event). An intent-based approach
to addressing the joint tenancy implications of this lease should honor
a clear statement of intent on this issue in the lease.
c) Whether a conveyance by one joint tenant of his or her interest
for the life of the transferee severs. Reported decisions are scarce, but

between following the Tenhet approach and an approach that views the granting of a lease
interest as effectually destroying the unity of interest).
80. For the attorney who is unsure concerning this approach, the old-fashioned
“straw” conveyance to a third party and back again prior to the lease will clearly sever.
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one approach relying on the traditional unities-based theory of
severance concludes that a severance pro tanto has occurred.81
While the growing trend in other jurisdictions is application of an
intent-based analysis to traditional severance issues,82 that approach,
absent more facts or specific language in the conveyance, produces a
result as unclear as that of a severance-based analysis.
d) Whether a contract to convey by one joint tenant severs during
the executory period prior to the closing. A consummated real estate
sales transaction, of course, severs a joint tenancy. But what happens
when only one joint tenant contracts to convey his or her interest and
then dies prior to the closing date? If a severance has occurred, then
the purchase price should be distributed pro rata according to each
tenant in common’s interest; if not, then the surviving joint tenant or
tenants enjoy all of the purchase price, and the heirs or devisees of
the deceased vendor joint tenant receive nothing.
The traditional approach to this issue is steeped in both a
destruction-of-unities analysis combined with the still viable common
law doctrine of equitable conversion. Upon the execution of a
specifically enforceable contract to convey his or her interest, the
joint tenant is transferring equitable title to the vendee and retaining
only bare legal title representing the right to receive the contract
price. Therefore, the conveyance of equitable title has been
traditionally considered a “severance” for joint tenancy law
purposes.83 As with the discussion of leases supra, an intent-based

81. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 18, at 190 (citing Hammond v. McArthur,
183 P.2d 1, 2–3 (Cal. 1947); Swartzbaugh v. Sampson, 54 P.2d 73, 75–76 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1936)) (“[I]f any of the joint tenants dies during the continuance of the life estate
conveyed, there is no immediate right of survivorship; but upon termination of the life
estate the joint tenancy revives or, if only one of the joint tenants is then living, he
acquires sole ownership in severalty.”).
82. See infra Section IV.B.
83. See STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 18, at 190–91 (“An executory contract to
convey one joint tenant’s interest—assuming the contract is specifically enforceable—
severs the vendor’s undivided interest from the joint tenancy in equity, so that the vendor’s
successors in interest will be entitled to the purchase money if the vendor dies before the
contract is performed. [However,] the courts are divided as to whether there is a
severance . . . when all the joint tenants join as vendors in the executory contract.”). Id.
(emphasis added) (citing In re Baker’s Estate, 78 N.W.2d 863, 866 (Iowa 1956) (holding
that a severance is effected, so that the vendors are entitled to the purchase money as
tenants in common)); see also Weise v. Kizer, 435 So.2d 381, 382 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)
(finding no severance “unless there is an indication from the contract, or from the
circumstances, that the parties intended to sever the joint tenancy”); Alexander v. Boyer,
253 A.2d 359, 365 (Md. 1969) (finding that an unexercised option to buy does not effect a
severance). This division clouds the question of whether each cotenant would be entitled
to a pro rata portion of the purchase money.
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approach to addressing the joint tenancy implications of the unilateral
execution of a contract to convey by one joint tenant should defer to a
provision on point in the contract. While current standard Form 2-T
does not cover this issue, an attorney-drafted contract to convey
dealing with this issue might prevent future disputes.84
e) Whether a contract to convey by all joint tenants severs during
the executory period prior to the closing. Once again, this issue matters
where one joint tenant dies prior to the real estate closing. The
purchase price should be distributed pro rata according to each
cotenant’s interest if a severance has occurred upon execution of the
contract; if no severance occurs until the closing date, then the
surviving joint tenant or tenants enjoy all of the purchase price, and
the heirs or devisees of the deceased vendor joint tenant receive
nothing. Courts are divided concerning whether severance occurs
under these circumstances.85 The authors favor an intent-based
analysis here as in most other “severance” scenarios. While intent
may be unclear and subject to dispute, basing severance theory on the
doctrine of equitable conversion removes the analysis to a clearer but
arbitrary framework of analysis.
f) Whether the granting of an option to purchase by one joint
tenant severs. This issue is triggered when a joint tenant grants
another the option to purchase the joint tenant’s interest in real
property, the joint tenant dies during the option period, and the
option is then timely exercised by the optionee after the death of the
optionor.86 Severance occurs under these circumstances only if a court

See also Weise v. Kizer, 435 So.2d 381, 382 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (finding no severance
“unless there is an indication from the contract, or from the circumstances, that the parties
intended to sever the joint tenancy”); Alexander v. Boyer, 253 A.2d 359, 365 (Md. 1969)
(finding that an unexercised option to buy does not effect a severance)).
84. The authors are not suggesting that Form 2-T, Offer to Purchase and Contract
(Revised 1/2015; jointly approved by the North Carolina Bar Association and the North
Carolina Association of Realtors®) be amended to cover what can be considered a rare
fact situation. The form is already twelve pages long (not counting addenda) and should
not be expected to cover every conceivable contingency. Assuming that the grantor/joint
tenant intends severance, the attorney who is unsure of what a North Carolina appellate
court will conclude on this issue might resort to the old-fashioned “straw” conveyance to a
third party and back again prior to execution of the contract to convey by the joint tenant.
85. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
86. See Lawes v. Bennett, 29 Eng. Rep. 1111, 1112–14 (1785) (applying a relationback theory combined with the doctrine of equitable conversion); Eddington v. Turner, 38
A.2d 738, 741–42 (Del. Ch. 1944) (“The theory of the relation back of the equitable
conversion as held in Lawes v. Bennett, does not appeal to us as either embodying the
intent of the testator or embodying any sound principle of law or equity.”). See generally
L.S. Tellier, Annotation, Equitable Conversion Doctrine as Applicable to Option to
Purchase Land, in the Event of Death of Optionor or Optionee Before Its Exercise, 172
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engages in two fictions: the doctrine of equitable conversion
combined with the doctrine of “relation back.” The unfortunate
reasoning is that, once an option to purchase is exercised, the exercise
relates back to the date of the option and triggers equitable
conversion as of that date. Under an intent-based analysis, we are
back to the unclear issue of whether the optionor joint tenant
intended to sever as of the granting of the option to purchase.87
g) Whether a pending divorce action severs.88 By a traditional
unities-based severance analysis, the commencement of an action for
divorce and even a final decree or judgment of divorce does not sever
any of the four unities.89 Therefore, contrary to the likely intent of
most couples seeking and obtaining a divorce, the counterintuitive
result is that the joint tenancy is not terminated. Under an intentbased approach, both the institution of an action for divorce and a
final judgment of divorce strongly indicate an implied intent by each
spouse to terminate the survivorship feature. Jurisdictions today are
divided, with a majority favoring an intent-based approach.90 The
A.L.R. 438 (1948) (considering the applicability of equitable conversion to options to
purchase land by analyzing the approaches taken by numerous jurisdictions).
87. Since it is likely that the optionor/joint tenant does intend to sever, the option
agreement itself should include a provision on point or the optionor/joint tenant’s attorney
should effect a severance prior to execution of the option. See Alexander, 253 A.2d at 365.
88. Divorces by joint tenant spouses will continue to be a rare occurrence in North
Carolina. Divorces involving tenants by the entirety, on the other hand, number in the
thousands each year. The tenancy by the entirety is the preferred and predominant form
of concurrent ownership by married couples in North Carolina. However:
The tenancy by the entirety differs from the joint tenancy because, in a
substantial majority of states that recognize it, (1) the individual
undivided interests cannot be transferred without the consent of both
spouses; (2) the individual interests cannot be reached by creditors of
one spouse; and (3) partition is unavailable as a remedy for owners
who cannot agree about what to do with the property; instead, the
owners can sever their relationship only by divorce.
SINGER, supra note 79, at 356. A divorcing couple may nonetheless desire to continue to
own real property as joint tenants. See, e.g., Whittaker v. Preston, 336 P.3d 921, 921 (Kan.
Ct. App. 2014) (unpublished table decision) (divorcing couple agreed to continue to hold
property as joint tenants following their divorce).
89. See, e.g., Young v. McIntyre, 672 S.E.2d 196, 203 (W. Va. 2008) (reciting the
common law four unities, holding that a joint tenancy is not severed by a divorce decree
alone, but finding that a divorce settlement agreement was “sufficient to cause destruction
of the four unities by implication” based upon an implied intent theory).
90. While the filing of a divorce proceeding may not be the act that actually severs the
joint tenancy, it will in all likelihood and probability be the impetus that causes the parties
to sever their joint tenancy. See SPRANKLING, supra note 40, § 10.04[A][3], at 145. “Most
courts appear to follow a presumption that a divorcing spouse does not intend to preserve
any right of survivorship in the other spouse, and thus tend to interpret ambiguous
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issue should not, however, be left to chance or implication. Either a
unilateral severance or a court order expressly dealing with this
question is the prudent way to deal with this issue.
h) Whether a pending action for partition severs. The uniform
rule in all jurisdictions,91 including North Carolina, is that a tenant in
common or joint tenant is entitled as a matter of right to petition for
and obtain a partition.92 Neither G.S. 41-2 nor Chapter 46 of the
North Carolina General Statutes address the severance issue. The
formal filing by one or more joint tenants of a petition to partition
presents a quintessential example of the need for an intent-based
approach to severance. As with pending divorce actions, it is unlikely
that a joint tenant who has petitioned for partition intends the
survivorship feature to continue until the partition is final. An intentbased approach, therefore, logically requires termination of the joint
tenancy upon filing the petition for partition.93 As a matter of

agreements as terminating the joint tenancy.” Id. (citing Mann v. Bradley, 535 P.2d 213,
214 (Colo. 1975) (agreement impliedly severed joint tenancy)). But see Porter v. Porter,
472 So. 2d 630, 634 (Ala. 1985) (divorce decree did not sever joint tenancy); see also
STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 18, at 192 (“A divorce decree between spouses who
are joint tenants does not sever the joint tenancy if the decree does not dispose of the
jointly held property.”); id. at 191 n.22; Porter v. Porter, 472 So. 2d 630, 630 (Ala. 1985)
(no severance even though one spouse awarded sole possession); Estate of Layton, 52 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 251, 251 (1996). But whether a joint tenancy between spouses persists after a
divorce decree is entered ordering the former spouses to join in sale of the property
depends either upon the intent of the parties as evidenced in the divorce proceedings or
upon the subjective or manifested intent of the trial judge. In re Marriage of Lutzke by
Lutzke v. Lutzke, 361 N.W.2d 640, 650 (Wis. 1985).
In North Carolina, the issue is perhaps purely academic, since real property
devised or conveyed to a husband and wife with nothing else appearing results in a
tenancy by the entirety. JAMES A. WEBSTER, PATRICK K. HETRICK, & JAMES B.
MCLAUGHLIN, JR., WEBSTER’S REAL ESTATE LAW IN NORTH CAROLINA, § 7.04[1][b],
at 7–8 (6th ed. 2014). A tenancy by the entirety cannot be unilaterally severed and ends
only upon the death of one spouse, a final divorce, or mutual agreement. On the other
hand, “normal” joint tenants (those who are not married to one another) would not have
any cause, standing, or reason to seek divorce from their cotenants rendering the issue
moot. However, at this time, this issue has not reached a court in North Carolina, meaning
the analysis is far from certain.
91. “Absent a contrary agreement, each cotenant has a right to obtain partition—
without proving any cause or reason—regardless of any inconvenience, burden or damage
to other cotenants.” SPRANKLING, supra note 40, § 10.04[B], at 145.
92. WEBSTER, HETRICK, & MCLAUGHLIN, JR., supra note 90, § 7.14[1], at 7-23 (citing
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 46-22 (2013); Seawell v. Seawell, 233 N.C. 735, 738, 65 S.E.2d 369, 371
(1951); Hyman v. Edwards, 217 N.C. 342, 344, 7 S.E.2d 700, 702 (1940); Talley v.
Murchison, 212 N.C. 205, 206, 193 S.E.2d 148, 148 (1937); Foster v. Williams, 182 N.C. 632,
635, 109 S.E. 834, 836 (1921); Bomer v. Campbell, 70 N.C. App. 137, 139, 318 S.E.2d 841,
842 (1984); Harris v. Harris, 51 N.C. App. 103, 107–08, 275 S.E.2d 273, 276–77 (1981)).
93. One might challenge this statement by creating a scenario where a non-petitioning
joint tenant predeceases the petitioner. In fairness, severance at the commencement of the
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preventive law, the severance issue should be addressed either at the
commencement of the partition process by court order or by a simple
unilateral severance procedure once one joint tenant opts to
partition.94
Unities-based severance theory resolves this issue in a
counterintuitive manner by finding no severance until the partition
process is complete.95 While most appellate courts continue to adhere
to that theory, some acknowledge discomfort in the process and
identify limited exceptions.96
i) Whether the filing of a judgment against one joint tenant severs.
While a sale on execution of a judgment against one joint tenant
severs, authorities are divided on the issue of whether a levy of
execution or attachment preliminary to a sale severs.97 The common
partition action benefits all parties. Intent must be measured as of a point in time and
should not be cancelled by a fortuitous change in facts as the partition action progresses.
94. Another possibility, of course, is a preventive legal approach through the addition
of a provision in Chapter 46 of the General Statutes or a comprehensive revision of G.S.
41-2.
95. See, e.g., Goetz v. Slobey, 908 N.Y.S.2d 237, 238–39 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010)
(holding joint tenant’s commencement of partition action and moving out of the house did
not destroy unity of interest or possession and precluded severance prior to the joint
tenant’s death); Orlando v. Deprima, 870 N.Y.S.2d 871, 872 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (noting
that “the apparently universal rule in this country is that a pending suit for partition of a
joint tenancy does not survive the death of one of the tenants”).
96. See, e.g., O’Brien v. O’Brien, 391 N.Y.S.2d 502, 503 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976)
(adopting exception where parties to a partition proceeding stipulated to all pertinent facts
and all that remained to be done was a computation of the interests and liabilities of the
joint tenants).
97. See STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 18, at 191 (“Severance of one joint
tenant’s undivided interest from the joint tenancy may result from an involuntary transfer
of that interest, e.g., by virtue of a sale of the interest by the joint tenant’s trustee in
bankruptcy or by virtue of a sale on execution of a judgment against the joint tenant. But
there is a division of authority as to whether a mere levy of execution, or an attachment,
without sale, effects a severance. A court-ordered mortgage foreclosure sale of one joint
tenant’s interest will, of course, sever a joint tenancy even in a ‘lien theory’ state. A
divorce decree between spouses who are joint tenants does not sever the joint tenancy if
the decree does not dispose of the jointly held property.”). North Carolina authorizes a
seldom used procedure authorizing a judgment creditor of a judgment debtor who owns
an undivided interest in fee in land to institute a special proceeding for partition. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 46-5 (2013). The statute is silent on whether that action by the judgment
creditor severs a joint tenancy, and the answer in this instance should be in the negative.
The statute provides, in part:
Upon the actual partition of the land the judgment creditor may sue
out execution on his judgment, as allowed by law, and have the
homestead of the judgment debtor allotted to him and sell the
excess. . . . The remedy provided for in this section shall not deprive
the judgment creditor of any other remedy in law or in equity which he
may have for the enforcement of his judgment lien.

CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 1649 (2015)

1676

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93

law rule, based upon unities-severance theory, is that the mere entry
of judgment does not sever.98 An intent-based rule of termination of
the joint tenancy should produce the same result. A revision of G.S.
41-2 to cover this contingency would prevent future
misunderstandings and litigation.99
j) Whether the filing of a bankruptcy petition severs. This issue
arises when a debtor joint tenant or non-debtor dies during the
bankruptcy process.100 One commentator recently observed that,
while few courts have ruled on this issue, a split of authority exists.101
Courts finding a severance of the joint tenancy once a bankruptcy
petition is filed rely on the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Act,
assume that the debtor’s interest in property includes “title” to
property, and rely on the elimination of unity of title.102 On the other
hand, several bankruptcy cases do not find severance, perhaps in part
based on the probable intent of the joint tenants.103
k) Whether a mortgage or deed of trust executed by one joint
tenant severs. The Countrywide case and a full discussion and critique
of this issue are discussed in other parts of this article.104 In a nutshell,
the issue is now answered by the addition of subsection (a1) to G.S.
41-2.105
l) Whether unilateral severance by one joint tenant occurs by a
direct conveyance from that joint tenant to herself. In a recent

Id.
98. See Fisher, supra note 42, at 658–64 (discussing the common law rule as the law of
West Virginia, and noting that, “if the common law is not to be followed in this instance, it
would be because it has been changed by statute”).
99. The authors, however, are pessimistic about the outcome of a statutory
clarification in light of the method of clarifying the Countrywide case with the addition of
subsection (a1) to G.S. 41-2. Judgment creditors will lobby for a severance result. While
we are not opposed to that legislative result if a full and transparent discussion of the
competing public policies and property interests takes place, we fear another surreptitious
amendment.
100. Jonathan D. Luke, Note, Joint Tenancies in Bankruptcy: Preserving Post-Petition
Survivorship Rights for Debtors and Non-Debtors Alike, 47 IND. L. REV. 585, 596 (2014).
101. Id. at 599–600.
102. Id. at 596–98 (citing In re Yun Chin Kim, 288 B.R. 431, 434 (Bankr. D. Md. 2002);
In re Tyson, 48 B.R. 412, 413–14 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1985); In re Panholzer, 36 B.R. 647, 651
(Bankr. D. Md. 1984); In re Lambert, 34 B.R. 41, 42–43 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983).
103. Id. at 599–602 (citing In re Anthony, 82 B.R. 386, 388 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1987); In
re Spain, 55 B.R. 849, 854 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 1985)).
104. See infra Part II.
105. No matter what the jurisdiction, clearly a completed foreclosure sale severs. See,
e.g., In re Williams, 476 B.R. 329, 333 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2012) (holding severance of a
joint tenancy occurs by a completed foreclosure of one joint tenant’s interest).
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appellate court decision in Kansas,106 two cousins owned real property
as joint tenants with right of survivorship.107 Nine years later, one
cousin, with the intent of severing, signed a quitclaim deed conveying
his interest in the joint tenancy to himself, gave the deed to his
attorney for recordation, and then died six days later.108 The Kansas
Court of Appeals held that the cousin’s unilateral act of executing a
quitclaim deed and giving it to his attorney for recordation effectively
severed the joint tenancy.109 The court explained this result, in part, as
follows: “Just as a grantor can create a joint tenancy by unilaterally
transferring ownership to himself or herself, so should a grantor be
able to sever a joint tenancy through self-conveyance.”110
Will North Carolina follow the Kansas approach? The following
more complete example should be instructive: A and B own North
Carolina land as joint tenants with right of survivorship. A then
executes a deed naming the grantor as “A, a joint tenant with right of
survivorship” and naming the grantee as “A, a tenant in common.”
The deed language adds: “the purpose of this deed is to unilaterally
sever the joint tenancy between A and B and convert ownership to a
tenancy in common.”
North Carolina has no appellate court decision directly on point
to this example. In an 1853 decision, the Supreme Court held that an
infant en ventre sa mere and born within 280 days of execution of the
deed was capable of taking as grantee in a deed.111 The court opinion
recites the following maxims: “Property must at all times have an
owner. One person cannot part with the ownership unless there be
another person to take it from him. There must be a ‘grantor and a
grantee, and a thing granted.’”112 Because the foundation for the
common law rule was the ancient ceremony of feoffment by livery of
seisin, there is no contemporary public policy rationale for applying

106. Reicherter v. McCauley, 283 P.3d 219 (Kan. Ct. App. 2012).
107. Id. at 220.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 223.
110. Id. at 222.
111. Dupree v. Dupree, 45 N.C. 164, 164–65 (1853); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-5
(2013) (“An infant unborn, but in esse, shall be deemed a person capable of taking by
deed or other writing any estate whatever in the same manner as if he were born.”);
Mackie v. Mackie, 230 N.C. 152, 155, 52 S.E.2d 352, 354 (1949).
112. Dupree, 45 N.C. at 167; see also 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *296
(“So as in every grant there must be a grantor, a grantee, and a thing granted . . . .”).
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the rule to the unilateral severance of a joint tenancy by a deed from
the joint tenant grantor to himself as a tenant in common.113
In a sense A’s conveyance is by A as the owner of one distinct
category of concurrent ownership to A as owner of another distinct
category. With legal advice, A could have easily severed by use of a
straw-person and subsequently receiving a conveyance back. Since a
joint tenancy can now be created by a conveyance from A to A and
B, there is little or no reason to require A to go through the straw
transaction to sever.114 Contemporary hornbooks and treatises list the
requirements of a valid deed as including an identification of grantor
and grantee.115 That requirement should not preclude the severance
deed in the above example. Above all, a court should honor A’s clear
intent.116
m)Whether severance by implication, including a written statement
or agreement of severance without a conveyance, is recognized.
Applying an intent-based test for whether severance occurs by
implication through the agreements and conduct of joint tenants—
particularly if understandings are based on informal communications
and oral agreements—will undoubtedly qualify these scenarios as
litigation magnets. The traditional unities-based approach to
severance, on the other hand, provides a challenging but not
insurmountable test.117 In addition, some jurisdictions take an intentbased approach, recognizing the concept of intent to sever by
implication, including severance through the conduct of the joint
tenants.118

113. Dupree, 45 N.C. at 168 (“Suppose a case of land, which at common law could only
pass by feoffment. To whom, or to what could livery of seisen [sic] have been made? Who
would have performed the services?”).
114. See supra Section I.B for the discussion of the “Elimination of Three of the Four
Common Law Unities.”
115. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 18, § 11.1, at 807–08; SPRANKLING, supra
note 40, § 23.04[A][1], at 379.
116. What the authors consider the distastefulness of stealth unilateral severances is
discussed infra Section IV.B.
117. See, e.g., Edwin Smith, L.L.C. v. Synergy Operating, L.L.C., 285 P.3d 656, 667–68
(N.M. 2012) (recognizing intent-based severance by implication via an agreement between
all joint tenants inconsistent with the four unities or right with the right of survivorship).
118. See, e.g., Estate of Woods v. McBeth, No. B240946, 2013 WL 5772025, at *3–4
(Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2013) (stating that the unexecuted settlement agreement
demonstrated intent to sever pursuant to California Civil Code section 683.2, but the
court’s decision nonetheless discusses traditional “four unities”).
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D. Appellate Court Silence on Creation and Severance Issues
With the exception of the Countrywide “deed of trust/severance
holding,” there is no other North Carolina appellate court decision
since the 1991 reincarnation of the joint tenancy on any other
traditional creation and severance issues, despite these issues being
commonplace in other jurisdictions. Why? In an overwhelming
majority of other states, the traditional tenancy by the entirety is not
recognized,119 and the most utilitarian replacement has been the joint
tenancy or community property. North Carolina, on the other hand,
recognizes, presumes, and thereby encourages the tenancy by the
entirety form of ownership for married couples.120 Recent trends in
North Carolina, however, indicate an increasing use of the joint
tenancy form of ownership, particularly among non-married couples.
A second explanation for the dearth of existing North Carolina
appellate court decisions on traditional joint tenancy issues since 1991
is that the transaction costs of appealing matters of civil law combined
with the time delay in ultimate resolution can consume years. In other
words, the paucity of controversies may be confirmation only of the
reality that the game of resolving traditional joint tenancy issues in
court most often is not worth the candle.121 Thus, hundreds, and
perhaps thousands, of North Carolina creation and severance issues
may arise each year, but they neither grace trial court nor court of
appeals chambers.
E.

The Need for Clarification

Additional statutory guidance on both joint tenancy creation and
severance issues is appropriate because mistakes in attempting to
create a joint tenancy, or achieving or attempting to achieve a
severance, are commonplace, particularly where a layperson engages

119. See STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 18, § 5.5, at 193 (noting that “tenancies
by the entirety have now been abolished in all but twenty jurisdictions”).
120. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-13.6 (2013). See supra note 73 for the text of this subsection.
This statute presuming a tenancy by the entirety might also include a provision that a
failed attempt to create a tenancy by the entirety should result in the creation of a joint
tenancy, the closest default form of concurrent ownership. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.
184, § 7 (2011) (“A conveyance or devise of land to two persons as tenants by the entirety,
who are not married to each other, shall create an estate in joint tenancy and not a tenancy
in common.”). Unfortunately, the tenancy by the entirety is periodically under attack by
creditors seeking a way to reach entirety assets for the debt of one spouse.
121. Most appellate court decisions are appeals, in part at least, of a summary
judgment motion and can often result in a remand and, therefore, a continuing transaction
cost.
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in self-help drafting.122 If cases from other jurisdictions are any
indication, even experienced attorneys sometimes overlook a
potential severance issue that often results in no harm but that
sometimes comes back to haunt the parties. If, for example, an
attorney does not recognize that, in her jurisdiction, the
commencement of a divorce proceeding does not in and of itself sever
the joint tenancy, no harm occurs if both joint tenants survive until a
final decree or judgment that addresses the matter. Likewise, a
petition for partition by one joint tenant does not sever a joint
tenancy in many jurisdictions, and no problem arises where all joint
tenants survive to the final partition sale or division in kind. But
preventive law requires skilled attorneys to consider “worst case
scenarios.” While a rare occurrence, one joint tenant might
predecease the other during the pendency of a divorce action or
partition proceeding. The standard assumption in a divorce is, we
assume, that neither unhappy spouse intends for the other to take by
survivorship after the action has commenced. Likewise, the oftendisgruntled joint tenant who wishes to end the joint tenancy by
petitioning for partition probably presumes logically but erroneously
in some jurisdictions that the survivorship feature ends with the
petition.123
F.

A Joint Tenancy that Cannot Be “Broken”

Unilateral severance, particularly stealth unilateral severance
without notice to the other joint tenant or joint tenants, is the
Achilles’ heel of contemporary American joint tenancy law. In a
recent case, for example, a mother conveyed property to her daughter
and her niece in 2001 “as joint tenants with right of survivorship and
not as tenants in common.”124 The deed also included the following
language: “IT IS THE INTENTION of all the parties of this deed
that title shall vest in the grantees as joint tenants, so that on the
death of one of them the survivor will take the whole estate herein
conveyed.”125

122. See, e.g., Crossland v. Crossland, No. CV126028025, 2013 WL 1849272, at *1–3
(Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 11, 2013).
123. Preventive law in a jurisdiction following a unities-based approach to severance in
these instances dictates either (i) a prompt motion for a court order eliminating the
survivorship feature, or; (ii) a unilateral conveyance of one joint tenant’s interest to the
venerable straw-man who will dutifully re-convey back, an archaic—and we argue silly—
but effective legal cure.
124. Kail v. Knudeson, 328 P.3d 1235, 1236 (Okla. Civ. App. 2014).
125. Id.
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The mother died shortly after the deed was executed and
recorded, and the niece did not become aware of the deed until four
years later.126 Subsequently the niece unilaterally severed the joint
tenancy by executing a deed of the property to a third party who
promptly deeded the property back.127 All deeds were duly recorded,
and subsequent conveyances were made of the niece’s fifty percent
interest.128 The daughter, upset about the unilateral severance,
commenced an action in 2010 to reform or cancel her mother’s 2001
deed.129 She asserted that her mother’s true intent was to create a
joint tenancy that one joint tenant “could not break.”130 While a
normal reading of the 2001 deed might justify a layperson’s opinion
that the joint tenancy “could never be broken,” the court properly
rejected the daughter’s argument.131 The niece’s actions clearly
severed the joint tenancy in all jurisdictions on either an “intent” or
“severance of a unity” theory.132
II. COUNTRYWIDE133
Hindered by a lack of statutory guidance, including the
numerous shortcomings and general incompleteness of G.S. 41-2, the
court of appeals in Countrywide addressed a predictable severance
scenario. Importantly, the legal dispute before the court presented an
opportunity to focus on the quintessential policy question of whether
severance theory should be unities-based or intent-based. As the
following discussion of Countrywide reveals, the court opted for a
traditional unities-based analysis while providing examples of statutes

126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1236–37.
131. Id. at 1238. (quoting Estes v. ConocoPhillips Co., 184 P.3d 518, 526 (Okla. 2008)
(noting that “ignorance of the law is no excuse and every person is presumed to know the
law”).
132. See, e.g., Albro v. Allen, 454 N.W. 2d 85, 87–88 (Mich. 1990) (recognizing two
different types of joint tenancies, one “standard,” one “indestructible”). An indestructible
joint tenancy is not severable by unilateral action because that would deprive the other of
her right of survivorship. Id.
133. 220 N.C. App. 504, 725 S.E.2d 667 (2012). The troubled history of Countrywide
Home Loans, Inc. is well known in real estate circles. See, e.g., Jim Puzzanghera & Walter
Hamilton, BofA to Pay $16.65-billion over Soured Home Loans in Mortgage Meltdown,
L.A. TIMES (August 21, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-bank-americasettlement-20140822-story.html. For more insight into the subprime mortgage market
meltdown of 2008, including Countrywide’s loan practices, see BETHANY MCLEAN & JOE
NOCERA, ALL THE DEVILS ARE HERE: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE FINANCIAL
CRISIS 138–45 (2010).
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from two other jurisdictions for consideration by members of the
General Assembly.
A. The Facts
The following description by the court of appeals provides more
detailed facts than the abstract134 introducing this article:
The record tends to show the following: On 25 March 2001,
Margaret D. Smith (“Mrs. Smith”) and Mrs. Smith’s daughter
and son-in-law, Judy and Troy Reed (“Defendants”), executed
an offer to purchase and contract to buy a home in Mooresville,
North Carolina. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., (“Plaintiff”)
agreed to finance the purchase of the home and provided a loan
to Mrs. Smith in the amount of $117,900.00. The general
warranty deed named the grantees as “Margaret D. Smith and
Troy D. Reed and wife, Judy C. Reed Joint Tenants with rights
of survivorship[.]” The deed of trust to secure Plaintiff’s loan
and promissory note was prepared in Mrs. Smith’s name only
and was executed by Mrs. Reed, as attorney in fact for Mrs.
Smith, on 1 May 2001. Neither Mr. Reed nor Mrs. Reed signed
the deed of trust or promissory note in his or her individual
capacity.135
Following the closing, all three lived together in the home with
the daughter and son-in-law caring for the elderly mother “such that
Mrs. Smith was not required to go to a nursing home.”136 Less than
five months after the closing, the mortgage loan went into default and
foreclosure proceedings were commenced.137 Mrs. Smith died several
years later in 2004 while the mortgage loan remained in default and
prior to any foreclosure sale.138 Several months later, ongoing
negotiations took place between Mr. and Mrs. Reed and resulted in a
loan modification agreement “purportedly” amending and
supplementing the original deed of trust.139 In 2006, the Reeds sought
a further loan modification, which was denied.140

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

See supra pp. 101–02.
Countrywide, 220 N.C. App. at 505, 725 S.E.2d at 668.
Id. at 505, 725 S.E.2d at 669.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 506, 725 S.E.2d at 669.
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The Trial Court

In 2009, Countrywide filed a complaint against the Reeds seeking
reformation of the deed of trust to make them obligors under the
mortgage loan.141 The Reeds filed an answer and counterclaims
alleging negligent misrepresentation and a violation of North
Carolina mortgage law.142 In 2011, Countrywide filed a summary
judgment motion seeking judgment as a matter of law on both its
claim as plaintiff and the defendant Reeds’ counterclaims.143 The
Reeds promptly filed a motion for summary judgment raising the
statute of limitations as a bar to reformation and denied any liability
for the mortgage loan.144
The trial court granted summary judgment in Countrywide’s
favor.145 When the dust settled on the trial court’s analysis, Mrs.
Smith’s one-half interest was found to be vested in the Reeds by
survivorship, but remained subject to the Countrywide deed of
trust.146 The Reeds’ one-half undivided interest owned as tenants by
the entirety was held not to be encumbered.147
C.

The Court of Appeals

The court of appeals, faced with the first traditional joint
tenancy/severance issue in North Carolina history, noted that the
question presented was a “novel one.”148 In truth, most joint tenancy
issues that the appellate courts of this state will face in coming years
will also be cases of first impression and, therefore, “novel” ones.
After recognizing that the deed to Mrs. Smith and the defendants
created a joint tenancy with right of survivorship, the court recited the
fact that Mrs. Smith became the sole obligor under the deed of trust
filed one minute after delivery of the general warranty deed.149 Next,
the court summarized the issue by holding “the deed of trust severed
the joint tenancy,”150 thus limiting the encumbrance to the portion

141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 507, 725 S.E.2d at 669.
147. Id. at 507, 725 S.E.2d at 669–70. The trial court’s judgment does not use the terms
“joint tenancy” or “severance.” Paragraph 5 of the order reads: “Troy D. Reed and wife
Judy Reed own the real property in fee simple absolute; subject to Plaintiff’s deed of trust
encumbering a one-half undivided interest in said property.” Id. at 507, 725 S.E.2d at 670.
148. Id. at 509, 725 S.E.2d at 671.
149. Id.
150. Id.
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owned by Mrs. Smith. In the alternative, if “the deed of trust did not
sever the joint tenancy,” the encumbrance would attach to the entire
property.151
The statement of the second issue bears careful scrutiny because
it begs an important question of joint tenancy law. For if a deed of
trust executed by only one joint tenant does not sever the joint
tenancy, the crucial issue then becomes whether the deed of trust
encumbrance ceases to exist when the mortgagor joint tenant dies.
Professor Singer notes that “the courts are split,” but further observes
that “most states provide that, even though the mortgage does not
sever the joint tenancy, it survives the death of the joint tenant who
granted the mortgage and continues to burden that fractional interest
that is now owned by the surviving joint tenant.”152 We find the
apparent majority rule to be a counterintuitive approach favoring
savvy mortgagees with constructive knowledge of the status of title to
the mortgaged property over the survivorship property rights of the
non-signing joint tenant.
The court of appeals recognized the split in other jurisdictions on
the issue in the following note located at the end of the decision.
Other States have codified statutes addressing the particular
question raised in this appeal, and our General Assembly may
also consider and address this issue, should it be so inclined.
South Carolina, S.C. Code Ann. § 27-7-40(a)(iii) (2011)
prohibits any encumbrance of a joint tenancy unless all joint
tenants join in the encumbrance. See S.C. Code Ann. § 27-740(a)(iii) (providing, “[t]he fee interest in real estate held in
joint tenancy may not be encumbered by a joint tenant acting
alone without the joinder of the other joint tenant or tenants in
the encumbrance”). In Wisconsin, Wis. Stat. § 700.24 (2011)
provides that on the death of a mortgaging joint tenant the
survivor takes subject to the mortgage. See Wis. Stat. § 700.24
(stating that a real estate mortgage, a security interest, or a lien
“on or against the interest of a joint tenant does not defeat the
right of survivorship in the event of the death of such joint
tenant, but the surviving joint tenant or tenants take the
interest such deceased joint tenant could have transferred prior

151. Id.
152. SINGER, supra note 79, at 352 (citing Harms v. Sprague, 456 N.E.2d 976, 979 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1983) for the first proposition and citing Brant v. Hargrove, 632 P.2d 978, 981–82
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1981) and WIS. STAT. § 700.24 (2001) for the second).

CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 1649 (2015)

2015]

JOINT TENANCY IN NORTH CAROLINA.

1685

to death subject to such mortgage, security interest or statutory
lien”).153
The helpful reference by the court of appeals to the statutes of two
other jurisdictions evidences perhaps an unspoken uneasiness by the
court concerning its resolution of the severance issue. True, the
court’s result is logically correct based on a traditional common law
“severance of unities approach,” but it sacrifices the obvious intent of
the parties to create a joint tenancy. As we discuss below, the General
Assembly’s legislative response has numerous shortcomings.
III. A FLAWED LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO COUNTRYWIDE
As summarized immediately above, the court of appeals
concluded in Countrywide with a helpful footnote that pointed out
the distinctly different approaches of two other states while deferring
to the legislature “should it be so inclined.”154 In this Part of the
article, we report that the General Assembly opted to adopt the
mortgagee-friendly Wisconsin approach over the South Carolina
approach favoring non-signing joint tenants. Further, we opine that
the legislative response is flawed for a number of practical, public
policy, and theoretical reasons.
A. Countrywide “Reversed” and More
Pressured, assumedly by mortgage lenders and other creditors,
the General Assembly promptly responded to Countrywide by adding
new subsection (a1) to G.S. 41-2 as follows:
(a1) Upon conveyance to the trustee of a deed of trust by any
or all of the joint tenants holding property in joint tenancy with
right of survivorship to secure a loan, the joint tenancy with
right of survivorship shall be deemed not to be severed, and
upon satisfaction of the deed of trust, legal title to the property
subject to the joint tenancy shall revert to the grantors as joint
tenants with right of survivorship in the respective shares as
owned by the respective grantors at the time of the execution of
the deed of trust, unless a contrary intent is expressed in the
deed of trust or other instrument recorded subsequent to the
deed of trust.155

153. Countrywide, 220 N.C. App. at 510–11 n.2, 725 S.E.2d at 672 n.2. See infra Section
III.A for a discussion of what we consider the flawed legislative response to Countrywide.
154. Id.
155. Act of June 26, 2013, ch. 322, § 41-2, 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 575, 577 (codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2(a1) (2013)).
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However, as is unfortunately too often the case with important
statutory changes to North Carolina real property law, the new
subsection passed through the General Assembly flying quietly under
the radar without meaningful opportunity for vetting by concerned
consumer groups and the practicing bar in general. The new joint
tenancy law subsection was buried in the midst of a fourteen-page
session law with a title making no reference to the key change in
mortgage law.156 Indeed, the session law focuses on an extensive
revision and clarification of notary public law, with ten sections
dedicated to that area preceding the addition of the new joint tenancy
law subsection of G.S. 41-2(a1),157 with twenty-six additional sections
on notary public issues immediately following.158 Finally, the session
law adds a series of statutory amendments addressing satisfaction of
security interest procedures, sections that have nothing to do with the
new joint tenancy subsection, G.S. 41-2(a1).159 For these reasons it is
doubtful that the new joint tenancy language received much notice in
advance of enactment.
B.

Critique of the Amendment

As seen above in the language of the new subsection G.S. 412(a1), the statute allows a mortgagee to obtain a deed of trust
executed by only one joint tenant, who then predeceases the other or
others, that encumbers the surviving non-mortgagor/joint tenant’s (or
joint tenants’) title to the property. While there is no case directly on
point, the clear result of this statutory approach is to render the title
of the survivor or survivors unmarketable until the mortgage debt of
the deceased joint tenant is satisfied.160
The one-sided language favoring the mortgagee materially alters
the traditional law of joint tenancy. Under the statute, the joint
tenancy is not deemed severed, and legal title to the property does

156. Act of June 26, 2013, ch. 322, 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 575 (The session law is titled:
“AN ACT MAKING CORRECTIONS AND OTHER AMENDMENTS TO THE
NOTARY PUBLIC ACT, MAKING OTHER CONFORMING CHANGES, AND
PROVIDING FOR AN ALTERNATIVE PROCEDURE FOR SATISFACTION OF
SECURITY INSTRUMENTS.”).
157. Id. §§ 1.1 to .10. The revision to G.S. 41-2(a1) is located at section 1.11.
158. Id. §§ 1.12 to .38.
159. Id. §§ 2.1 to .8.
160. See, e.g., Burkhead v. Farlow, 266 N.C. 595, 598, 146 S.E.2d 802, 805 (1966)
(quoting Pack v. Newman, 232 N.C. 397, 400, 61 S.E.2d 90, 92 (1950)) (defining
“marketable title” as title “free from reasonable doubt in law or fact as to its validity”);
Kniep v. Templeton, 185 N.C. App. 622, 633, 649 S.E.2d 425, 432 (2007) (defining
“marketable title” as title that is free from major defect).
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not “revert” to the grantors, until the deed of trust is satisfied.161 The
language salvages the ineptitude of a commercial mortgagee—always
represented by attorneys—who nonetheless ignorantly granted a
mortgage loan to one joint tenant without obtaining the signature of
the other(s). Meanwhile, the losers under subsection (a1) will often
be a consumer/mortgagor not represented by an attorney and a nonsigning joint tenant who had nothing to do with the promissory note
and loan documents. In Countrywide, for example, joint tenants Judy
and Troy Reed, the daughter and son-in-law of Mrs. Smith (the only
joint tenant to sign the note and deed of trust at the closing) never
applied for the mortgage loan, were not named in the note or deed of
trust, and were not asked by the mortgagee to sign the note as
borrowers.162
The new subsection concludes with a provision holding the joint
tenancy in abeyance on a mortgage executed by the predeceasing
joint tenant/mortgagor valid until the mortgage debt is satisfied. This
is the case “unless a contrary intent is expressed in the deed of trust
or other instrument recorded subsequent to the deed of trust.”163 The
language, while appearing to be even-handed, does not ring true from
the typical consumer/mortgagor’s vantage point. In almost all
residential mortgage loan transactions, mortgagees dictate the
contents of a deed of trust and will take care not to include language
suggesting a “contrary intent.” Consequently, the language is of no
value to consumers, a waste of legislative ink.
A major shortcoming of subsection (a1) is that the statutory
language runs contrary to a cardinal principle of joint tenancy law: A
surviving joint tenant does not take title to the property by a
survivorship transfer at the death of the predeceasing joint tenant.
Rather, the surviving joint tenant takes the entire estate by virtue of
the joint tenancy estate created by the original conveyance.164 As one
hornbook author colorfully observes:
The right of survivorship stems from the common law’s
schizophrenic vision of a joint tenancy, expressed in archaic
French as “per my et per tout.” Joint tenants were seen as both
(a) a unit that owned the entire estate and (b) individuals who
each owned an undivided fractional share (or moiety) in the
161. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2(a1) (2013).
162. Brief of Defendant-Appellants at 5, Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v. Reed, 220
N.C. App. 504, 725 S.E.2d 667 (2012) (No. COA11-769).
163. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2(a1).
164. David E. Missirian, Separate But Equal? Same Sex Couples in New England, 35
REAL EST. L.J. 558, 559 (2007).
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estate. Since joint tenant D already owned the entire estate, C’s
death was not seen as creating any new rights in D. Rather, the
death merely withdrew C’s interest from the estate, leaving D
as the only remaining owner.165
Put another way, the right of survivorship is not a future interest
like a reversion or remainder. Accordingly, a surviving joint tenant
does not receive anything from a decedent joint tenant.166
In spite of a national split of authority on whether a mortgage
lien continues after the death of the joint tenant/mortgagor, the
General Assembly’s approach to this issue runs counter to a
foundational principle of real property law: A grantee can acquire no
greater title than the grantor has,167 for “a stream can flow no higher
than its source.”168 Ultimately, the subsection language awards a
mortgagee of the joint tenant/mortgagor a bonus at the expense of
diminishing the real property interest of the non-mortgaging joint
tenant.
Accepting arguendo that subsection (a1) serves a valid public
purpose by preserving a deed of trust as security after the death of a
mortgagor/joint tenant, it nonetheless obscures that purpose with
language that perplexes when applied to basic joint tenancy fact
situations. For example, assume that, on November 5, 2013, A and B
take title to North Carolina land as joint tenants with right of
survivorship; on March 26, 2014, B unilaterally executes a deed of
trust of B’s interest in the land to a mortgagee to secure repayment of
B’s loan, and; B then dies on February 17, 2015, leaving few assets
and owing a substantial amount of money on the mortgage loan.
Applying the literal language of (a1) to this example, “the joint
tenancy with right of survivorship shall be deemed not to be
severed.”169 A joint tenancy, therefore, continues to exist between A
& B in our example after B’s unilateral execution of a deed of trust in

165. SPRANKLING, supra note 40, §10.02[B][1], at 132. Sprankling defines “per my et
per tout” as meaning “by the share and by the whole.” Id. § 10.02[B][1], at 132 n.7; see also
Fisher, supra note 42, at 640 (citing 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.1 (A. James
Casner ed., 1952) (noting, inter alia, that the right of survivorship in the joint tenancy is not
a type of future interest, and that the deceased joint tenant’s estate is extinguished upon
his or her death)).
166. See STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 18, § 5.3, at 183 n.6 (citing 2 HERBERT
THORNDIKE TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 419 (3d ed. 1939)).
167. Ashworth v. Bullock, 304 P.3d 74, 78 (Utah Ct. App. 2013) (holding that a joint
tenant may not transfer more than his or her own interest in joint tenancy property).
168. Quotation attributed to Dr. Robert E. Lee. Dr. Lee was a Professor of Law and
dean emeritus at Wake Forest University Law School. Professor Lee died in 1977.
169. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2(a1) (2013).
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2014; but B then died, and A is the now the sole owner of the land.
The (a1) language continues to befuddle when it continues:
[A]nd upon satisfaction of the deed of trust, legal title to the
property subject to the joint tenancy shall revert to the grantors
as joint tenants with right of survivorship in the respective
shares as owned by the respective grantors at the time of the
execution of the deed of trust.170
Once again, the statutory language is puzzling when applied to a
simple scenario. Assuming that the statute requires payment of the
mortgage loan by A to clear the real property of the mortgage
encumbrance—the joint tenant who did not execute the mortgage
note and deed of trust—and assuming A pays the outstanding
mortgage loan balance to satisfy the deed of trust, it makes no sense
at all in this example to apply the statutory language. A is now the
sole owner of the property. In no way can title to the joint tenancy
revert as directed by the statute. Presumably, the intent of the drafter
of subsection (a1) would have been better served by stating that a
mortgage lien continues to encumber joint tenancy property after the
death of a mortgagor/joint tenant to the extent of that mortgagor’s
interest when she executed the deed of trust; i.e., the surviving joint
tenant or tenants take subject to the mortgage to that extent.
The Countrywide fact situation is nothing but a slight variation
on the above example. While three people—mother, daughter, and
son-in-law—took title as joint tenants with right of survivorship,
North Carolina law treats the married couple as “one,” owning a fifty
percent undivided interest as tenants by the entirety as between each
other.171 Thus, when the mother died, only one legal person, the
husband-wife entity, remained.172 As of her death, the joint tenancy
ceased to exist in spite of the statutory language deeming it not
severed by the mother’s execution of the deed of trust.173
Finally, it is counterintuitive as a matter of public policy that
mortgagees, without fail represented by attorneys and loan officers,
merit statutory protection from their folly in a Countrywide
mortgage-loan situation where, casting all common sense to the wind,
a mortgagee accepts the signature of only one of three joint tenants
on a deed of trust. Prior to and after the enactment of new subsection

170. Id.
171. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v. Reed, 220 N.C. App. 504, 510, 725 S.E.2d 667,
671 (2012).
172. Id. at 509–10, 725 S.E.2d at 671 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2(b)).
173. Id. at 510, 725 S.E.2d at 671–72.
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(a1), prudent mortgagees need only obtain the signatures of all joint
tenants to adequately secure repayment of the mortgage loan.
Instead, in light of the new subsection, mortgagees will potentially
enjoy a windfall at the expense of the joint tenant who has not signed
the deed of trust, and might not even have knowledge of its execution
by the other joint tenant. Ultimately, the new language encourages
mortgage loans secured by the signature of only one joint tenant.174
IV. CREATION AND SEVERANCE ISSUES IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS:
HISTORICAL PREJUDICE TO EMERGING EMBRACE
As we have demonstrated, the joint tenancy estate has coursed a
tumultuous, winding road in American jurisprudence over the past
two centuries.175 Joint tenancies were once readily accepted and
recognized as a preferred form of concurrent property ownership
within early American common law.176 That preferred status did not
last long, however. The sweeping political reform ushered in by the
American Revolution included casting aside English common law
notions of primogeniture, whereby the eldest son inherited the family
estate, and the jus accrescendi, or right of survivorship, concomitant

174. Harkening back to our discussion of “predictable creation issues,” supra Section
I.C.1, would prospective concurrent owners of real property be better off taking title in
one of the following ways?
1) “to A & B jointly with right of survivorship and not as joint
tenants;”
2) “to A & B for their joint lives with right of survivorship and not as
joint tenants;”
3) “to A & B as joint life tenants, contingent remainder to the survivor,
and not as joint tenants,” or;
4) “to A & B as tenants in common with right of survivorship and not
as joint tenants.”
Admittedly, each alternative comes with its own theoretical and practical
inventory of strengths and weaknesses, although each would not fall under the
purview of subsection (1b).
175. See generally John V. Orth, Joint Tenancy Law: Plus ça Change . . ., 5 GREEN BAG
2D 173 (2002) (chronicling the history of joint tenancy law and suggesting continued
stability of and societal demand for the joint tenancy estate).
176. 4 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, SECOND THOMAS EDITION § 31.06(a) (David
A. Thomas ed., 2004) [hereinafter THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY]; see, e.g., Alexander
v. Boyer, 253 A.2d 359, 363 (Md. 1969) (citing Hannan v. Towers, 3 H. & J. 147, 148–49
(Md. 1810) (“At common law it was presumed that a conveyance to two or more persons
created a joint tenancy.”); Wilson v. Johnson, 46 P. 833, 834 (Kan. Ct. App. 1896)
(“Estates in entirety and joint tenancies are recognized by our supreme court as existing in
Kansas, and, until the passage of chapter 203 of the Session Laws of 1891, the right of
survivorship under the common law was in full force and effect.”).
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to joint tenancies.177 Beginning in the latter half of the 18th century,
acceptance of joint tenancies as a natural form of concurrent
ownership quickly turned to repudiation as states and territories
began rejecting joint tenancies as intrinsically un-American.178 The
rapidity of the movement against joint tenancies was expressed in
anything but parsed words. Courts and legislatures alike denounced
joint tenancies with bitter contempt describing these estates as
“odious and unjust,”179 “odious in equity,”180 and “adverse to the
understandings, habits, and feelings of the people.”181 The tenor of the
day is best reflected within the preamble to a 1784 North Carolina
omnibus statute abolishing joint tenancy that proclaims: “In real and
personal estate held in joint-tenancy the benefit of the survivor is
manifest injustice to the families of such as may happen to die first.”182
For the better part of the past two centuries, legislatures, courts,
and practitioners have largely continued to hold firm to the notion
that joint tenancies should be viewed with hostility, are nothing more
than a mere gamble, and create harsh and unforeseen results.183 Yet,
neither this continued hostility nor abolition of the common law form
of joint tenancies has ended use of the estate. Despite historic
opposition, the joint tenancy estate remarkably has endured and
remains an ever-popular form of concurrent ownership.184 Joint
tenancies are common in the financial industry for the ownership of
177. Orth, supra note 175, at 177.
178. See, e.g., Burnett v. Pratt, 39 Mass. (22 Pick.) 556, 557 (1839) (“Even the common
law now favors tenancies in common . . . and the policy of our legislation is decidedly
adverse to joint tenancies. The doctrine of survivorship is not in accordance with the
genius of our institutions.”); Sergeant v. Steinberger, 2 Ohio 305, 306 (1826) (“The laws
passed, both during the territorial government and since, authorize joint tenants, tenants
in common, and coparceners, and, in some cases, the executors, administrators, or
guardians of such persons, to demand and have partition. It is, from this, evident that the
legislature have treated a joint tenancy as a tenancy in common.”); Lynch v. Frost, 727
P.2d 698, 699 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986); Choman v. Epperley 592 P.2d 714, 719 (Wyo. 1979)
(“[T]he policy of the American law is opposed to the creation of a joint tenancy with the
entire property going to the survivor, at least unless the parties clearly demonstrate that is
the intent . . . .”)).
179. Whittlesey v. Fuller, 11 Conn. 337, 340 (1836).
180. Davidson’s Lessee v. Heydon, 2 Yeates 459, 461 (Pa. 1799).
181. Sergeant v. Steinberger, 2 Ohio 305, 306 (1826).
182. Act of 1784, ch. 22, reprinted in 24 THE STATE RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA
574 (Walter Clark ed., 1905) (emphasis added).
183. Alexander v. Boyer, 253 A.2d 359, 366 (Md. 1969) (citing A. R. Kimbrough,
Comment, Cotenancy: Effect of Conveyances, Leases, and Encumbrances of One
Contenant in Excess of His Interest: Joint Tenancy: Effect of Lease as to Severance:
Remedies of Cotenants as Against Each Other, 25 CALIF. L. REV. 203, 208 (1937)); Cleaver
v. Long, 126 N.E.2d 479, 481 (Ohio 1955) (“Many members of the legal profession in Ohio
are of the opinion that joint tenancy is a thing to be frowned upon in this State . . . .”).
184. Orth, supra note 175, at 180.
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joint accounts,185 utilized by domestic partners to share property,186
offer value in avoiding probate delays and expenses,187 and provide
useful tools for elder and estate planning,188 among other uses.
Notwithstanding its popularity, historic skepticism has continued
unnecessarily to pervade legislative and judicial treatment of the joint
tenancy estate, slowing its progress as a contemporary tool for asset
management.
We now turn to a brief overview of some of the issues that
continue to plague the joint tenancy estate while illustrating some of
the preferable statutory approaches to creation and destruction. As
part of this endeavor, we will illustrate several progressive statutes
that may serve as models for North Carolina and other states in
taking a more enlightened view of joint tenancies in recognition of
their continued use and popularity. We begin with a brief discussion
of common law jurisprudence and the original context in which joint
tenancies were created before examining how colonial presumptions
disfavoring the estate continue to infect modern interpretational
issues. Next we explore an array of word choice considerations
affecting creation issues given the significant weight courts afford to
the precise language utilized in creating the joint tenancy estate.
Thereafter we delve into the abyss that is terminating joint tenancies,
the conflicting interests at stake, and the multitude of approaches
courts and legislatures have applied to destroying joint tenancy
interests. We conclude with a brief proposal for revising North
Carolina’s joint tenancy statute and the best formula for any statute
addressing the modern joint tenancy estate.
A. Creating Joint Tenancies: Unities to Express Intent
At common law, creating joint tenancies was entirely formalistic
in nature. A joint tenancy was deemed created by deed or devise
upon the conversion of the four unities of time, title, interest, and
possession.189 Simply, all tenants having “one and the same interest,
accruing by one and the same conveyance, commencing at one and
the same time, and held by one and the same undivided possession”
185. See, e.g., Holmes v. Beatty, 290 S.W.3d 852, 857 (Tex. 2009).
186. See, e.g., Walsh v. Reynolds, 335 P.3d 984, 995–96 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014).
187. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 64.28.010 (2013) (“Whereas joint tenancy with right
of survivorship permits property to pass to the survivor without the cost or delay of
probate proceedings, there shall be a form of co-ownership of property, real and personal,
known as joint tenancy.”).
188. See, e.g., Hendrickson v. Minneapolis Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 161 N.W.2d 688,
691–92 (Minn. 1968).
189. 7 POWELL, supra note 79, § 51.01[2], at 51-3 to -4.
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were considered joint tenants with the jus accrescendi right of
survivorship.190 Absent words of contrary expression, a conveyance as
basic as “to A and B and their heirs” immediately created a joint
tenancy.191 American courts sometimes referred to this form of
creation as “technical joint tenancy.”192 The absence of any one or
more of the four unities resulted in a failure of the joint tenancy
estate, irrespective of the intent of the parties.193
Although since denounced as manifestly unjust, the common law
four-unities approach to creating joint tenancies was not without
benefit. The specificity of each separate unity offered concrete terms
on which parties and courts could rely to determine the creation of
the joint tenancy estate.194 Those guideposts for creating joint
tenancies were largely lost when technical joint tenancy fell into
disfavor. The mere existence of the four unities by deed or devise will
not create a joint tenancy in any American state today.195
The majority of modern state statutes addressing joint tenancies
permit joint tenancies to be created by express declaration while
jettisoning the concept of technical joint tenancy in favor of tenancies
in common.196 A prime example is Maryland’s statute, which cuts off
common law joint tenancy while preserving the right of parties to
create the estate by simply stating:
No deed, will, or other written instrument which affects land or
personal property, creates an estate in joint tenancy, unless the
deed, will, or other written instrument expressly provides that
the property granted is to be held in joint tenancy.197
Maryland’s statute offers the clearest expression of legislative
abrogation of technical joint tenancies and embrace of joint tenancies
created by express terms. In fact, it is representative of the majority of
states that, in one form or another, echo the sentiment that joint
tenancies may only be created by an express declaration.198 Its
simplicity has enabled Maryland courts to easily conclude that the
legislature has embraced the rights of individuals to establish joint
190. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *180–81.
191. Id. at *180.
192. See, e.g., In re Hutchison’s Estate, 166 N.E. 687, 690 (Ohio 1929).
193. THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 176, § 31.06(b), at 15.
194. In re Estate of Johnson, 739 N.W.2d 493, 498 n.6 (Iowa 2007) (discussing the
clarity provided by the four unities that, in theory, offered a bright-line test for the
determination of joint tenancies).
195. 7 POWELL, supra note 79, § 51.02[1], at 51-5.
196. See THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 176, § 31.06(d), at 23.
197. MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 2-117 (LexisNexis 2012).
198. 7 POWELL, supra note 79, § 51.02[1], at 51-5.
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tenancies by express declaration.199 And its specificity offers flexible
options for parties seeking to create joint tenancies by clarifying that
they may do so by deed, will, or any other written instrument.200 In
doing so, the statute obviates the need for separate provisions
addressing different types of property, whether real or personal, or
different types of individual situations in which joint tenancies may be
utilized.
1. Presumptions and Construction of Joint Tenancies
Statutes enabling the creation of joint tenancies by express
declaration offer a foot in the door to those seeking to utilize the
estate. However, merely enabling a device without addressing the
presumptions or construction that should be applied when ambiguity
arises leaves open the question of how best to approach
interpretational issues when considering stilted or haphazard
language utilized by drafters.
Early courts often applied strict interpretation to any language
used to create joint tenancies. In Butler v. Butler,201 the court surveyed
the then-existing judicial sentiment of the late 1800s concluding “it is
established by an overwhelming and unanimous mass of authorities,
that such estates are not to be favored, and that courts are ‘to exercise
their ingenuity against them.’ ”202 Since that time, courts have slowly
evolved in considering the construction to apply in the event of
ambiguity in an instrument purporting to create a joint tenancy.203
Modern judicial analysis generally begins by recognizing that most
legislative policies require resolving any drafting ambiguity in favor of
199. E.g., Gardner v. Gardner, 335 A.2d 157, 160 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1975).
200. MD. CODE. ANN., REAL PROP. § 2-117.
201. 13 D.C. (2 Mackey) 96 (1882).
202. Id. at 100 (citing Chew v. Chew, 1 Md. 163, 171 (1851) (“On the contrary this
court is imperatively required by a long course of judicial decisions in this State and
elsewhere, sustained by every dictate of reason, justice and humanity, to view with
disfavor, estates in joint tenancy, and to give the widest and most liberal construction to
testamentary instruments, in order to defeat them wherever we can.”)); Bambaugh v.
Bambaugh, 11 Serg. & Rawle 191, 192 (Pa. 1824) (“The inconvenience of joint-tenancy,
has induced the courts to seize on every expression which indicates an intention to give a
separate interest to each.”); Evans v. Brittain, 3 Serg. & Rawle 135, 137–38 (Pa. 1817)
(“For many years past the judicial current has set strong against joint-tenancy, and
justly . . . .”); Galbraith v. Galbraith, 3 Serg. & Rawle 392, 392 (Pa. 1817) (“Joint tenancy
is, at this day, so far from being favoured that the Courts think themselves justified in
exercising their ingenuity against it.”); Martin v. Smith, 5 Binn. 16, 17–18 (Pa. 1812)
(“[N]othing can be more unnatural than an estate in joint-tenancy. It is with good reason
therefore that courts of justice have long been disposed to lay hold of slight expressions, in
order to make a tenancy in common.”).
203. See, e.g., James v. Taylor, 969 S.W.2d 672, 673–74 (Ark. Ct. App. 1998).
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establishing a tenancy in common rather than a joint tenancy.204 In
fact, most states have adopted legislative positions in favor of
construing estates as tenancies in common rather than joint tenancies
where ambiguity exists.205 However, where the express intent of the
grantor is clear, then the right to survivorship will be upheld.206 As the
Supreme Court of Ohio noted, “[i]f, on the other hand, a donor or
grantor, by the operative words of the gift or grant, clearly expresses
an intention to give the right of survivorship, such words will not be
disregarded.”207
For example, Arkansas’ statute enabling joint tenancies is titled
“tenants in common” and provides that:
Every interest in real estate granted or devised to two (2) or
more persons, other than executors and trustees as such, shall
be in tenancy in common unless expressly declared in the grant
or devise to be a joint tenancy.208
Arkansas’ statute favoring tenancies in common typifies most joint
tenancy statutes by continuing to reflect the early twentieth century
shift away from a constructional preference in favor of joint tenancies
to a constructional preference for tenancies in common.209 Notably,
however, more recent decisions and enactments have witnessed a
movement toward construing joint tenancies more favorably. Ohio’s
revised joint tenancy statute provides that “[a]ny deed or will
containing language that shows a clear intent to create a survivorship
tenancy shall be liberally construed to do so.”210 Iowa offers the most
recent legislative example of a state taking a progressive stance on
favorably construing the joint tenancy estate where revisions to its
longstanding joint tenancy statute became effective this year. The
statute states, in part:
A conveyance of real property to two or more grantees in a
conveyance instrument in any of the following circumstances
204. See, e.g., Kipp v. Chips Estate, 732 A.2d 127, 130 (Vt. 1999) (citing Cross v. Cross,
85 N.E.2d 325, 327 (Mass. 1949); Palmer v. Flint, 161 A.2d 837, 842 (Me. 1960); Gagnon v.
Pronovost, 71 A.2d 747, 750–51 (N.H. 1949) aff’d on reh’g, 71 A.2d 747, 749 (N.H. 1950)
(“Although the statute does allow a deed to create a joint tenancy by explicit language, the
legislative policy requires that we resolve ambiguity in favor of a tenancy in common
rather than a joint tenancy.”)).
205. THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 176, § 31.06(d), at 23.
206. 7 POWELL, supra note 79, § 51.02[1], at 51-7.
207. In re Hutchison’s Estate, 166 N.E. 687, 691 (Ohio 1929).
208. ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-12-603 (2011).
209. See, e.g., Erickson v. Erickson, 115 P.2d 172, 175 (Or. 1941) (quoting 3
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. 1445 (1940)).
210. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5302.20(A) (LexisNexis 2012) (emphasis added).
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creates a presumption of a joint tenancy with rights of
survivorship unless a contrary intent is expressed in the
instrument and subject to subsection 3:
a. The instrument identifies two or more grantees as married to
each other at the time the instrument is executed.
b. The instrument describes the conveyance to the grantees
with the phrase “joint tenants,” “joint tenancy,” or words of
similar import.
c. The instrument describes the conveyance to the grantees with
the phrase “or their survivor” with reference to the grantees, or
words of similar import.211
Iowa’s progressive stance exemplifies the modern trend toward
embracing joint tenancies where the intent of the transferor is clear.
By modifying the statutory presumption in favor of joint tenancies to
more closely reflect the intent of parties expressly creating these
estates, the Iowa statute offers appropriate assurance to those
utilizing joint tenancies for an array of individual purposes and serves
as a model for modern construction practices.212
2. Creating Joint Tenancies: What’s the Magic Word?
Absent progressive legislative or judicially recognized
presumptions in favor of joint tenancies, avoiding ambiguities in the
terminology employed to create a joint tenancy becomes all the more
important. At common law, the four unities of time, title, interest, and
possession defined joint tenancies and their creation.213 With the
convergence of these four unities, the joint tenancy estate was
established without any need for special or technical words to give it
life.214 Now that common law joint tenancies have been abrogated
throughout the states, creating joint tenancies is entirely dependent
on employing language that sufficiently demonstrates a manifest

211. Act of Apr. 3, 2014, ch. 1054, 2014 Iowa Acts 128 (to be codified at IOWA CODE
§ 557.15 (2012) (emphasis added).
212. Notably, the Iowa Supreme Court has also taken a progressive stance on
approaching creation and severance issues by casting aside all unities based analysis in
favor of a pure intent approach to joint tenancies. See In re Estate of Johnson, 739 N.W.2d
493, 497–98 (Iowa 2007).
213. 7 POWELL, supra note 79, § 51.01[2], at 51-3.
214. Hannah v. Towers, 3 H. & J. 147, 149 (Md. 1810) (finding no need for technical or
other words to confer a joint tenancy at common law); Holohan v. Melville, 249 P.2d 777,
782 (Wash. 1952) (en banc) (“Joint tenancy, distinguished by its grand incident of
survivorship, was a favorite of the common law and no special words or limitations were
necessary to call it into being.”).
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intent to establish the estate.215 Thus, where technical or other words
were once unnecessary to establish a right of survivorship in
concurrently held property, they very much are required today.216 The
primary question then becomes: “What are the magic words
necessary to create a joint tenancy?”217 The answer greatly depends
on the words chosen and the state where the estate is being created.
Statutes that go no further than to say that a joint tenancy may
be created by express terms are the least helpful to solicitors and
scriveners alike. Unfortunately, most statutes addressing joint
tenancies are noticeably silent on the words that may be considered
sufficient to create them. This silence is not surprising given the
historic context in which most of these statutes were passed. At the
time, the purpose of most state enactments addressing joint tenancies
was to abrogate the common law rule concerning the creation of joint
tenancies and to adopt a construction in favor of tenancies in
common.218 As originally conceived, joint tenancy statutes were not
designed to assist courts, practitioners, or parties in creating the very
estate being abrogated. It is little wonder then that most statutes fail
to offer any drafting guidance for creating joint tenancies.
a)

And By That You Meant What Exactly?

Without legislative guidance, courts have turned to the difficult
task of balancing the intent of the parties against presumptions in
favor of tenancies in common when construing language purporting
to create joint tenancies.219 The use of “jointly”220 or “jointly and
severally”221 has been held insufficient to create a joint tenancy as has
“share and share alike, or to the survivor.”222 A grant “unto the
survivor of them”223 has been considered a sufficient expression of
215. See 7 POWELL, supra note 79, § 51.02[1], at 51-7.
216. See id.
217. See id.
218. See, e.g., Palmer v. Flint, 161 A.2d 837, 841–42 (Me. 1960).
219. See, e.g., Kipp v. Chips Estate, 732 A.2d 127, 130 (Vt. 1999).
220. See, e.g., Mustain v. Gardner, 67 N.E. 779, 780 (Ill. 1903); Taylor v. Taylor, 17
N.W.2d 745, 748–49 (Mich. 1945) (“[T]he mere use of the word ‘jointly’ in the introductory
paragraph of a deed, with nothing in the granting or habendum clauses to indicate a joint
tenancy, ‘is not by itself a sufficient declaration of an intent to create an estate in joint
tenancy to overcome the statutory presumption.’ ”); Overheiser v. Lackey, 100 N.E. 738,
740 (N.Y. 1913). But see WIS. STAT. § 700.19 (2001) (“Any of the following constitute an
expression of intent to create a joint tenancy: ‘as joint tenants’, ‘as joint owners’,
‘jointly’ . . . .”) (emphasis added).
221. See, e.g., James v. Taylor, 969 S.W.2d 672, 675 (Ark. Ct. App. 1998); In re
Kwatkowski’s Estate, 29 P.2d 639, 640 (Colo. 1934).
222. Cross v. Cross, 85 N.E.2d 325, 327 (Mass. 1949).
223. Gardner v. Gardner, 335 A.2d 157, 160–61 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1975).
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intent to create a joint tenancy, whereas use of the phrase “and to the
survivors of them” has not.224
Conveyances to individuals “as tenants by the entireties” who
are not spouses have generated significant questions for courts
concerning the nature of the estate intended.225 The predominate
attribute shared by joint tenancies and tenancies by the entirety is the
right of survivorship in property.226 As a result, courts appropriately
focused on construing the intent of the parties have found that
ineffective attempts to create tenancies by the entirety establish joint
tenancies nonetheless.227 These have included tenants by the entirety
conveyances to brothers,228 mothers and daughters,229 unmarried
individuals,230 and persons in bigamous231 or incestuous void
marriages.232 However, the conclusion that an ineffective attempt to
create a tenancy by the entirety sufficiently demonstrates intent to
create a joint tenancy has not been universal. Courts that strictly
guard tenancies by the entirety as only allowable between spouses
have refused to construe its misapplication as an expression of intent
to create a joint tenancy.233
For courts in Massachusetts, this issue is quickly resolved by
referring to its joint estates statute that provides: “A conveyance or
devise of land to two persons as tenants by the entirety, who are not
married to each other, shall create an estate in joint tenancy and not a
tenancy in common.”234

224. Gagnon v. Pronovost, 71 A.2d 747, 749 (N.H. 1949) (holding the use of such
phrase “too sketchy and speculative to comply with the statutory requirement of a clear
expression to create a joint tenancy”), aff’d on reh’g, 71 A.2d 747, 749 (N.H. 1950).
225. See, e.g., Coleman v. Jackson, 286 F.2d 98, 100 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (considering the
creation of a tenancy between unmarried individuals and holding that the court is not
excused “from the duty of determining and effecting the intention of the grantor as it
appears on the face of the conveyance”).
226. See, e.g., id. at 102 (“Survivorship, the salient feature of joint tenancy, is also
perhaps the most important feature of tenancy by the entireties . . . .”); Pa. Bank & Trust
Co. v. Thompson, 247 A.2d 771, 771–72 (Pa. 1968) (“[A] joint tenancy best fulfills an
intent to create a tenancy by the entireties because both contain the survivorship
feature.”).
227. See supra notes 206–10.
228. Pa. Bank & Trust Co., 247 A.2d at 773–74.
229. Powers v. Buckowitz, 347 S.W.2d 174, 176 (Mo. 1961) (en banc).
230. Coleman, 286 F.2d at 103.
231. Wood v. Wood, 571 S.W.2d 84, 85–86 (Ark. 1978).
232. In re Estate of Everhart, 783 N.W.2d 1, 6–7 (Neb. Ct. App. 2010).
233. See, e.g., In re Estate of Kappler, 341 N.W.2d 113, 114 (Mich. 1983) (per curiam)
(“The addition of the language ‘as tenants by the entireties’ was not an express declaration
of joint tenancy.”).
234. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 184, § 7 (LexisNexis 2011) (emphasis added).
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Massachusetts’ statute is commendable. It offers courts,
practitioners, and title abstractors clear guidance on how to interpret
the intent behind occasional misuse of tenants by the entirety
language by non-spouses.235 Maine and Utah are the only other states
to also offer statutory embrace of the misapplication of tenants by the
entirety.236 In fact, most states fail to offer guidance on this and the
panoply of other more routine methods that may be acceptable for
creating joint tenancies.
b)

Creating Certainty: Words and Phrases Blessed by Statute

Statutes that clarify the method for creating joint tenancies
obviate interpretational issues that inevitably arise from inartful
drafting. And a few statutes are worth mentioning because of the
clarity or confusion they offer to courts and drafters alike. Colorado’s
joint tenancy statute offers statutory guidance for crafting joint
tenancies by christening use of the phrase “in joint tenancy,” “as joint
tenants,” “as joint tenants with rights of survivorship,” or “in joint
tenancy with right of survivorship,” and specifying that the
abbreviation “JTWROS” has the same meaning.237 Consequently,
courts in Colorado apply a simple test when construing instruments
purporting to create joint tenancies: Instruments that lack statutorily
prescribed language will not create joint tenancies.238 Even more
noteworthy is Maine’s joint tenancy statute that offers both a
construction in favor of joint tenancies and suggestive language for
creating the estate.239 Under the Maine statute, three different
methods are recognized for creating joint tenancies:
Deeds in which 2 or more grantees anywhere in the
conveyances are named as joint tenants or named as having the
right of survivorship or that otherwise indicate anywhere in the
conveyances by appropriate language the intent to create a
joint tenancy between such grantees must be construed as
vesting an estate in fee simple in such grantees with right of
survivorship.240

235. Id.
236. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 33, § 159 (2012); UTAH CODE § 57-1-5 (LexisNexis 2012).
237. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-31-101 (2012).
238. Taylor v. Canterbury, 92 P.3d 961, 964 (Colo. 2004) (en banc) (citing In re
Kwatkowski’s Estate, 29 P.2d 639, 640 (Colo. 1934)).
239. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 33, § 159.
240. Id. (emphasis added).
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Maine’s joint tenancy statue then goes on to offer perspicuous
guidance to drafters and courts by specifying the phrases that may be
used with assurance when creating joint tenancies when it says:
A conveyance of real property by the owner of the real
property to the owner and another or others, or by the owners
of the real property to the owners or to the owners and another
or others, as joint tenants or with the right of survivorship, or
that otherwise indicates anywhere in the conveyance by
appropriate language the intent to create a joint tenancy
between such owner or owners and such other or others or
between the owners by the conveyance, including language
such as “as joint tenants,” “in joint tenancy,” “as joint tenants
with rights of survivorship,” “with rights of survivorship,” “to
them and to the survivor of them,” “to them and their assigns
and to the survivor and the heirs and assigns of the survivor
forever” or “as tenants by the entirety” creates an estate in joint
tenancy . . . .241
The Colorado and Maine statutes reflect a commendable,
modern approach to addressing creation issues in joint tenancies.
Statutes that leave open interpretational questions only serve to
create confusion and litigation. Neither is necessary given the clear
guidelines
that
comprehensive
drafting
can
accomplish.
Unfortunately, all too many statutes are silent on acceptable methods
for creating joint tenancies. Worse still are statutes like North
Carolina’s that create potential litigation traps for those fully
intending and expecting to create a joint tenancy estate.
c)

Word Choice Traps for the Unsuspecting

The hallmark characteristic of the joint tenancy estate is the right
of survivorship.242 It is this salient characteristic that both defines the
joint tenancy estate and uniquely distinguishes it from tenancies in
common.243 Consequently, because survivorship necessarily defines
the joint tenancy estate, saying either “joint tenants” or “joint tenants
with rights of survivorship” says the same thing. A joint tenancy by its
nature includes the right of survivorship and any addition of “with
rights of survivorship” is merely superfluous. Courts have routinely
concluded that conveyances or devises to individuals as “joint
tenants” are sufficient to establish a joint tenancy without the need

241. Id. (emphasis added).
242. See, e.g., Tenhet v. Boswell, 554 P.2d 330, 334 (Cal. 1976) (en banc).
243. Canterbury, 92 P.3d at 964; 7 POWELL, supra note 79, § 51.01[1], at 51-3.
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for any additional language.244 Statutes in Colorado,245 Connecticut,246
Georgia,247 Iowa,248 Kansas,249 Maine,250 Massachusetts,251 New
Mexico,252 Utah,253 and Wisconsin254 all confirm that conveyances to
grantees “as joint tenants” alone creates a joint tenancy estate. Thus,
although harmless, the use of “with rights of survivorship” is mere
surplus when added to “as joint tenants”—at least in most states.
Notwithstanding the very nature of joint tenancies or the
construction applied in other state courts and legislatures, the
Oregon, Virginia, and North Carolina joint tenancy statutes create
potentially dangerous traps for lawyers and laypersons who transfer
property to grantees “as joint tenants.” In Oregon and Virginia, a
conveyance to two or more persons “as joint tenants” will not create a
joint tenancy unless the specific addition of “with survivorship” is
included in the instrument.255 Incredibly, at least in Virginia, further
specifying that the property is not to be held as tenants in common
will not suffice. In a decision that can only be harmonized by fervent
distaste for the joint tenancy estate, in Hoover v. Smith,256 the
Supreme Court of Virginia concluded that a conveyance to grantees
244. See, e.g., Downing v. Downing, 606 A.2d 208, 212 (Md. 1992) (“[W]e believe that
when a deed uses the words ‘joint tenants,’ as does the instrument in the instant case, this
language can be sufficient to establish that the property granted is to be held in joint
tenancy.”); Barrett v. Barrett, 34 A.2d 579, 588 (N.J. Ch. 1943) (“I think the addition of
the words ‘or their heirs and assigns’ did not in any wise indicate an intent to create any
estate other than that which testator called it, a ‘joint tenancy,’ and if this is so, the added
phrase may be discarded as mere surplusage.”); Coudert v. Earl, 18 A. 220, 221 (N.J. Ch.
1889) (“The use of the words ‘and not as tenants in common’ adds nothing to the sense of
the others, and is mere tautology and surplusage.”); Holmes v. Beatty, 290 S.W.3d 852, 859
(Tex. 2009) (“A ‘joint tenancy’ or ‘JT TEN’ designation on an account is sufficient to
create rights of survivorship in community property . . . .”).
245. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-31-101 (2012).
246. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 47-14a (2012).
247. GA. CODE ANN. § 44-6-190 (2010).
248. IOWA CODE § 557.15 (2012).
249. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-501 (2005).
250. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 159 (2012).
251. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 184, § 7 (LexisNexis 2011).
252. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-1-16 (West 2012).
253. UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-1-5 (LexisNexis 2010).
254. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 700.19 (West 2001).
255. OR. REV. STAT. § 93.180 (2007) (“[J]oint tenancy in real property is abolished and
the use in a conveyance or devise of the words ‘joint tenants’ or similar words without any
other indication of an intent to create a right of survivorship creates a tenancy in
common.”); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-20.1 (2012) (“When any person causes any real or
personal property . . . to be titled, registered, or endorsed in the name of two or more
persons ‘jointly,’ as ‘joint tenants’ in a ‘joint tenancy,’ or other similar language, such
persons shall own the property in a joint tenancy without survivorship as provided in § 5520.”).
256. 444 S.E.2d 546 (Va. 1994).
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“as joint tenants, and not as tenants in common” failed to express
sufficient intent to create a joint tenancy.257 The court deemed this
language “uncertain” and “insufficient, as a matter of law, to create a
survivorship estate.”258 According to the court, “[t]here still does exist
such an estate as a joint tenancy without survivorship,” which created
uncertainty because the parties may have intended such an estate.259
The court offered no support or citation in claiming that there are
estates in joint tenancy without survivorship and we can find none.260
For practitioners and parties in Virginia, the message is loud and
clear: An explicit reference to “survivorship” must be included in a
conveyance or devise, or the joint tenancy attempted will fail.
Although not as explicit as Oregon and Virginia, North
Carolina’s convoluted joint tenancy statute offers a similar trap for
the unwary by suggesting that a conveyance or devise must include a
reference to survivorship when it says that a joint tenancy may be
created “if the instrument creating the joint tenancy expressly
provides for a right of survivorship.”261 Given that the principal
incident of a joint tenancy is the right of survivorship, a North
Carolina instrument that conveyed property to grantees “as joint
tenants” would, by the nature of the joint tenancy estate, provide for
a right of survivorship. Unfortunately, if the statute remains
unrefined, only litigation and subsequent interpretation will serve to
confirm this analysis. Thus, it would seem that in Virginia and North
Carolina, the surest method for creating a joint tenancy by express
terms would be a conveyance or devise to two or more “as joint
tenants with rights of survivorship, and not as tenants in common.”262
B.

Terminating Joint Tenancies: Intent and Transparency

The right of survivorship incident to the joint tenancy estate is
more than a mere consequence or casual attribute; it is the essential
and defining feature associated with this unique estate.263 In fact, it is

257. Id. at 546, 548.
258. Id. at 548.
259. Id.
260. Id. To the contrary, the principal and defining characteristic of a joint tenancy is
the jus accrescendi, or right of survivorship. See supra text accompanying note 242.
261. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2 (2013) (emphasis added).
262. Cf. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-7-40 (2007) (“[W]henever any deed of conveyance of
real estate contains the names of the grantees followed by the words ‘as joint tenants with
rights of survivorship, and not as tenants in common’ the creation of a joint tenancy with
rights of survivorship in the real estate is conclusively deemed to have been created.”)
(emphasis added).
263. 7 POWELL, supra note 79, § 51.02[1], at 51-7.
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this survivorship feature that “satisfies some near-permanent societal
demand,” as illustrated by its popular usage in today’s culture.264 Yet
jurisprudentially, the “right” of survivorship is less of a right and more
akin to a mere hope.265 In truth, the moniker “right of survivorship” is
a legal misnomer that has perpetuated for several centuries.266 A joint
tenant merely holds an expectancy to prevail in the survival battle
with her fellow joint tenants.267 She maintains no vested right in the
survivorship feature appurtenant to the estate given that it is always
subject to termination while other tenants are living.268 Yet, like
creation, the question becomes how and by what methods
termination may be effectuated. This question has plagued property
law for several centuries and today modern legislatures and courts
continue to grapple with how severance issues should be construed
and the methods by which terminating a joint tenancy should be
effectuated.269
While few modern state statutes offer guidance on creating joint
tenancies, fewer still suggest any mechanism for destroying the estate
once established. As the New Mexico Supreme Court recently
conceded, “[o]ur statutes, while voluble on the subject of creating a
joint tenancy, are silent as to its termination.”270 Unfortunately, this
statutory silence is the norm. As a consequence, the typical analysis
applied to joint tenancy termination issues all too often remains
marred in an ancient four-unities based construction.271 Some modern
courts have become increasingly frustrated with the inflexibility of a
strict four-unities analysis and have begun augmenting it with
additional methods by which termination may be effectuated. Under
this augmented analysis, joint tenancies may be terminated by
destruction of one or more of the four unities, mutual agreement, or

264. Orth, supra note 175, at 180 (describing modern usage of the estate in joint
financial accounts, for avoiding probate expenses, as a will substitute, and among
unmarried couples); see supra text accompanying notes 184–88; see also Helmholz, supra
note 9, at 4 (explaining that despite presumptions favoring tenancies-in-common, joint
tenancies are frequently used and appear to be growing in popularity).
265. 7 POWELL, supra note 79, § 51.04[1], at 51-16.1 (“The survivorship right is not a
property interest, but is a mere expectancy incident to joint tenancy ownership—a mere
gamble that the holder of the survivorship right will survive the other joint tenants without
severance of the joint tenancy.”).
266. See Taylor v. Canterbury, 92 P.3d 961, 965 (Colo. 2004).
267. See id.; see also Tenhet v. Boswell, 554 P.2d 330, 334 (Cal. 1976) (en banc).
268. See Canterbury, 92 P.3d at 965.
269. See Helmholz, supra note 9, at 6.
270. Edwin Smith, L.L.C. v. Synergy Operating, L.L.C., 285 P.3d 656, 663 (N.M. 2012).
271. See Helmholz, supra note 9, at 6.
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inference implied by the course of conduct between joint tenants.272
Meanwhile other courts have made the appropriate decision to adopt
a purely intent-based analysis rather than trying to tinker with an
outmoded system. Most notably, the Iowa Supreme Court recently
cast aside entirely a unities-based analysis in favor of construing the
intent of the parties for all purposes, whether creation or
destruction.273
Unfortunately, many modern interpretational questions
concerning termination remain strictly tied to a formalistic, unitiesbased analysis that ignores the clear intent and purposes of the
parties.274 As a consequence, the need for legislative guidance that
focuses on objective manifestations of express intent is as important
in the termination context as it is in the creation. As Professor
Helmholz noted in his review of realism and formalism in joint
tenancies, “[h]appy are the courts of states where the legislature has
created a statutory presumption for determining severance questions,
or at least set some exact requirements for severing a joint
tenancy.”275 Having previously addressed the many issues joint
tenants encounter in creating joint tenancies, we focus now on
severance issues in the context of collective and unilateral actions
taken by joint tenants with a special emphasis on model statutes
offering guidance in fairly and efficiently terminating joint tenancies.
1. Collective Termination by All Joint Tenants
An ongoing question that has preoccupied courts and
practitioners in the severance context is whether an instrument
executed by all joint tenants operates as a conversion of the joint
tenancy into a tenancy in common.276 A conveyance strictly between
joint tenants terminates the estate with respect to the interest
conveyed, either in part or in whole.277 And deeds executed by all

272. See, e.g., Edwin Smith, L.L.C., 285 P.3d at 663 (noting these three methods of
terminating a joint tenancy).
273. See In re Estate of Johnson, 739 N.W.2d 493, 497 (Iowa 2007).
274. See, e.g., Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v. Reed, 220 N.C. App. 504, 510, 725
S.E.2d 667, 671 (2012); Walsh v. Reynolds, 335 P.3d 984, 996 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014)
(concluding that a joint tenancy had been severed at its inception “[d]espite the parties’
clear specification that they took the property as joint tenants with right of survivorship”).
275. Helmholz, supra note 9, at 25 (citing NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-2,109 (2009)).
276. See, e.g., Ball v. Mann, 199 P.2d 706, 708 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1948); Buford v.
Dahlke, 62 N.W.2d 252, 255 (Neb. 1954); Swenson & Degnan, supra note 9, at 475.
277. THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 176, § 31.08(a).
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joint tenants to third parties plainly destroy the joint tenancy estate.278
However, transfers of lesser interests are not as clear.279 For example,
where A, B, and C enter into a contract to sell property held by the
three of them as joint tenants, does the mere execution of the contract
sever the joint tenancy?
Under the accepted common law theory of equitable conversion,
an executory contract for the sale of real property effectively splits
legal and equitable title such that equitable title inures to the buyer,
whereas bare legal title remains with the seller as security for
payment of the purchase price.280 Some courts have reasoned that the
equitable division of title with a third party operates as a severance of
the joint tenancy estate.281 According to this analysis, a joint tenancy
is destroyed at the moment an agreement to sell is signed. The fact
that an agreement is wholly silent on survivorship is inconsequential.
The intent of the parties or the subsequent termination of the
contract plays no role in the analysis.282 This hyper-formalistic
approach has been criticized before,283 and some courts have
appropriately refused to join in similar reasoning.284 We agree. An
analysis that blindly couples a legal fiction with an outmoded unities
construction unnecessarily delivers a severance result that ignores the
intent of the parties.
However, it is not always clear whether instruments signed by all
joint tenants sever the joint estate, even when using an intent-based
analysis. The parties may not express their intent to maintain or
terminate their survivorship rights in the contracts, leases, and others
documents they collectively execute. As a consequence, some courts
have turned to amorphous considerations of whether the acts of the

278. See, e.g., Ball, 199 P.2d at 708; Register of Wills for Montgomery Cnty. v. Madine,
219 A.2d 245, 247 (Md. 1966) (“We think there can be little doubt that a conveyance of the
legal title by all the joint tenants destroys the joint tenancy in the property conveyed.”).
279. 7 POWELL, supra note 79, § 51.04[1][b], at 51-20.
280. Id. § 81.03[1], at 81-82 to -83.
281. See, e.g., Buford, 62 N.W.2d at 255–56 (“It logically follows from what has been
said that if all the joint tenants enter into a joint contract to sell the joint property, receive
and accept a part of the purchase price, and put the purchaser in possession of the
property, this destroys the joint tenancy in the realty, even though the vendor retains legal
title to the realty as security for the balance of the purchase price.”).
282. See generally Hughes v. De Barberi, 107 N.W.2d 747, 749 (Neb. 1961) (asserting
that an agreement to sell property per se destroys a joint tenancy without any mention or
consideration of the intent of the parties).
283. See, e.g., Swenson & Degnan, supra note 9, at 476.
284. See, e.g., Watson v. Watson, 126 N.E.2d 220, 224 (Ill. 1955); Simon v. Chartier, 27
N.W.2d 752, 754 (Wis. 1947).
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parties as a whole demonstrate a desire to terminate their
survivorship interest in property held in joint tenancy.285
The Arizona Supreme Court confronted this issue for the first
time in deciding In re Estate of Estelle286 when a couple who owned
property as joint tenants filed for divorce and subsequently entered
into a comprehensive property settlement agreement.287 The
settlement agreement included provisions for the eventual sale and
distribution of the joint tenancy property, but made no mention of the
survivorship estate in the interim.288 After its execution, but before
the property was listed for sale, the former husband died.289 His exwife then claimed full survivorship rights in the property maintaining
that the settlement agreement did not operate as a severance.290 The
court began by noting that in many jurisdictions “a contract to convey
operates, in equity, as a severance of the joint tenancy.”291 Yet no
contract with a third party existed.292 The parties had only agreed
between themselves that the property would eventually be sold.293
Nonetheless, the court decided that the joint tenancy had been
severed.294 The court concluded that the couple’s agreement to divide
the proceeds of the future sale of the property was “patently
inconsistent with the continued right of survivorship.”295 As a
consequence, the court concluded that the parties had severed the
estate by implication.296
Legislative guidance and preventive drafting offer better
solutions to severance issues where joint tenants act in concert.
Wisconsin and South Dakota both have statutory presumptions in
favor of maintaining survivorship where all joint tenants contract to
sell their property, unless the parties expressly provide otherwise.297

285. See, e.g., Wardlow v. Pozzi, 338 P.2d 564, 565–66 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959).
286. 593 P.2d 663 (Ariz. 1979).
287. Id. at 664.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 665.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 664.
294. Id. at 667.
295. Id. at 666.
296. Id. at 667.
297. WIS. STAT. § 700.21 (2001); S. D. CODIFIED LAWS § 43-26-4 (2004). South Dakota
also has promulgated title standards applicable to contracts for deeds to property held in
joint tenancy that favor maintaining the survivorship incident to the property, stating “[a]
contract for deed for the sale of real property held in joint tenancy does not have the
effect of dissolving the joint tenancy relationship of the vendors if the contract for deed is
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In fact, Wisconsin preserves survivorship in the proceeds from the
purchase price.298 Unfortunately, these statutes appear only to address
real estate sales contracts and not the litany of other potential issues
that may arise where all joint tenants join in a transaction—from
property settlement agreements to leases and liens. Georgia takes a
broader approach to collective agreements by stating that no
severance occurs in recorded lifetime transfers signed by all joint
tenants.299 However, the best model is found in a Nebraska statute
that offers a clear, straightforward approach to construing the acts of
all joint tenants without the necessity of relying on a cumbersome
unities analysis or implied destruction considerations: “There shall be
no severance of an existing joint tenancy in real estate when all joint
tenants execute any instrument with respect to the property held in
joint tenancy, unless the intention to effect a severance expressly
appears in the instrument.”300
There are multiple benefits to the Nebraska presumption in
favor of preserving survivorship. Joint tenants may freely execute
contracts without worry that they may have to recreate their joint
tenancy in the event that a deal collapses. They may collectively enter
into leases, options, rights of first refusal, and other agreements
without constantly having to reaffirm their intent to maintain the
property with rights of survivorship. And joint tenants seeking to
mortgage their interest in the property would not have their
survivorship rights terminated, irrespective of whether they reside in
a “lien theory” or “title theory” state.
Although an intent-based approach to severance is the preferred
analysis, intent alone cannot always answer questions raised by the
actions of joint tenants acting in concert. Legislative presumptions
like those found in Nebraska assure the status quo but are rare
indeed. Until such presumptions are adopted more broadly,
preventive lawyering necessitates that practitioners drafting
documents for joint tenants acting together affirmatively state within
their instruments whether the transaction is intended to destroy the
joint tenancy between the parties or is otherwise intended to be
unaffected.

executed by all the joint tenants, unless otherwise specifically provided in the instrument.”
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 43-30 tit. standard § 2-06 (2004).
298. WIS. STAT. § 700.21.
299. GA. CODE ANN. § 44-6-190 (2010).
300. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-2, 109 (2009).
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2. Unilateral Termination by Individual Tenants
The customary rule applied to individual severances by less than
all joint tenants is generally stated as follows: joint tenants have the
absolute, unilateral right to terminate a joint tenancy301 and may do so
at any time without the knowledge or consent of any other tenant.302
Our discussion supra concerning predictable severance issues
illustrates how courts have upheld unilateral severances, whether
intended or not, by tenants conveying, encumbering, partitioning,
divorcing, mutually agreeing, or even “acting inconsistently” with the
right of survivorship.303 Some courts have steadfastly maintained a
unities-based approach to unilateral severances, irrespective of
intent.304 Others have sought a middle ground that augments a unities
analysis with additional severance considerations involving course of
conduct and mutual agreements.305 Still others have shuttered unities
entirely by adopting a purely intent-based approach to severance
issues by joint tenants acting alone.306
A recurring theme with unilateral acts that terminate a joint
tenant’s right to survivorship concerns the method by which an act
may be deemed sufficient to sever and the notice, consent, or
knowledge that is deserving of fellow joint tenants. We begin by
considering the opposing ends of the spectrum between indestructible
joint tenancies and those terminable by stealth actions of a single
tenant without the knowledge, notice, or consent of the other passive
joint tenants. Standing in-between these poles we see the opportunity
for a reasoned approach to severance that embraces the unilateral
right of any joint tenant to sever the survivorship feature associated
with her interest, while offering objective severance standards and
reasonable notice to her fellow tenants. As we will demonstrate,
transparency and fair dealings in the joint tenancy context are best
promoted through statutory language that demands public recording

301. 7 POWELL, supra note 79, § 51.04[1], at 51-16 to 16.1.
302. See, e.g., In re Estate of Hoffman, 653 N.W.2d 94, 98 (S.D. 2002).
303. See discussion supra at Section I.C.2.
304. See, e.g., Helinski v. Harford Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 831 A.2d 40, 46 (Md. 2003); In re
Estate of Potthoff, 733 N.W.2d 860, 867–68 (Neb. 2007).
305. See, e.g., Nicholas v. Nicholas, 83 P.3d 214, 225 (Kan. 2004) (holding additional
severance considerations should be included in severance analysis, but “intent alone will
not sever the joint tenancy”).
306. See, e.g., In re Estate of Johnson, 739 N.W.2d 493, 497 (Iowa 2007) (formally and
expressly adopting an intent-based approach); In re Estate of Knickerbocker, 912 P.2d
969, 976 (Utah 1996) (finding substantial support for the concept that severance should be
governed by the intent of the parties rather than destruction of the four unities).
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and actual notice to all other tenants of any instrument that
terminates an interest in the joint tenancy estate.
a)

Indestructible Estates: Thou Shalt Not Sever

At one end of the concurrent ownership spectrum are
indestructible estates that may not be severed by individual tenants.
As a general rule, unlike tenancies by the entirety, joint tenancies are
not characterized by inseverability.307 Of course, parties may always
convey interests in property as joint life estates with cross-contingent
remainders as a method of insuring the inseverability of the
survivorship feature.308 But those estates are vested interests distinctly
separate and apart from joint tenancies. Nonetheless, some courts
have recognized unique forms of joint tenancy estates that are
inseverable.309
Michigan, for example, has long acknowledged a special form of
joint tenancy that is indestructible. In Albro v. Allen,310 the Michigan
Supreme Court first recognized two types of joint tenancies: ordinary
joint tenancies and indestructible joint tenancies.311 In that state,
granting instruments that include express words of survivorship create
a joint estate characterized by joint life estates with contingent
remainders.312 These contingent remainders are vested survivorship
rights that are indestructible.313 In states that have abolished joint
tenancies, other courts have recognized similar life estates with vested
cross-contingent survivorship remainders that create indestructible
survivorships when a joint tenancy is attempted.314 Some courts have
even endorsed a “tenants in common with rights of survivorship”
estate with similar indestructible, vested, cross-contingent
survivorship features in remainder.315 Likewise, Oregon mandates by
statute that “[a] declaration of a right to survivorship creates a
307. See 7 POWELL, supra note 79, § 51.04[1], at 51-16. Certainly, there are mechanisms
that may be used to exercise more stringent control over property ownership, including
trusts, corporate entities, and other methods beyond the scope of this article.
308. See Swenson & Degnan, supra note 9, at 469.
309. See, e.g., Sanderson v. Saxon, 834 S.W.2d 676, 679 (Ky. 1992); Jackson v. Estate of
Green, 771 N.W.2d 675, 677 (Mich. 2009); Albro v. Allen, 454 N.W.2d 85, 88 (Mich. 1990);
Brown v. Brown, 706 N.E.2d 872, 874 (Ohio 1998).
310. 454 N.W.2d 85 (Mich. 1990).
311. Id. at 88.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. See, e.g., Hilterbrand v. Carter, 27 P.3d 1086, 1089 (Or. Ct. App. 2001) (quoting
Halleck v. Halleck, 337 P.2d 330, 338 (Or. 1959)).
315. See, e.g., Durant v. Hamrick, 409 So. 2d 731, 736 (Ala. 1981); Smith v. Cutler, 623
S.E.2d 644, 646–47 (S.C. 2005).
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tenancy in common in the life estate with cross contingent remainders
in the fee simple.”316 Ironically, Oregon’s statute creates an even more
rigid estate than the joint tenancy it abolishes.317
Most notably, the Ohio legislature has adopted an indestructible
joint-tenancy-type estate its calls a “survivorship tenancy.”318 This
special estate has the essential features of a concurrent estate held in
joint tenancy but is significantly distinguished by its indestructibility:
A conveyance from any survivorship tenant, or from any
number of survivorship tenants that is from less than all of
them, to a person who is not a survivorship tenant vests the title
of the grantor or grantors in the grantee, conditioned on the
survivorship of the grantor or grantors of the conveyance, and
does not alter the interest in the title of any of the other
survivorship tenants who do not join in the conveyance.319
In construing this “survivorship tenancy” statute, the Ohio court in
Brown v. Brown320 noted that the “clear purpose of these statutes is to
ensure that title vests in the surviving joint tenant or tenants at the
time of death.”321
Thus, at one end of the spectrum we see survivorship estates and
quasi-joint tenancies with inseverable qualities offering no
opportunity for individual severance of the survivorship feature.322 As
much as these estates preserve and guarantee survivorship rights, they
eviscerate the unique flexibility commonly associated with joint
tenancies and serve to frustrate the intent of parties who are no
longer desirous of maintaining the joint tenancy relationship.323
b)

Termination At-Will, Transparency at Risk

At the other end of the spectrum are traditional joint tenancy
estates that are severable at-will by any joint tenant without regard to

316. OR. REV. STAT. § 93.180 (2007).
317. See id.
318. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5302.20 (LexisNexis 2012).
319. Id. § 5302.20(C)(2) (emphasis added).
320. 706 N.E.2d 872 (Ohio Com. Pl. 1998).
321. Id. at 873.
322. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 93.180 (2007).
323. See generally Albro v. Allen, 454 N.W.2d 85, 89 (Mich. 1990) (holding that when a
seller of a one-half interest in a joint tenancy entered into a purchase agreement to convey
her interest to a buyer, the interest conveyed to the seller and the other cotenant was a
joint life estate with indestructible dual contingent remainder).
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transparency.324 Within these estates an individual joint tenant may
elect to terminate her survivorship interest without the knowledge,
consent, or notice to any other tenant. Undoubtedly, one of the
associated hazards with using the traditional joint tenancy estate is
the right of an individual tenant to effectuate a termination, thereby
destroying the right of survivorship.325 Because the survivorship
incident to the estate is not vested, any single tenant may decide to
convert her interest into a tenancy in common at any time. However,
the common hazard associated with unilateral termination becomes
exacerbated by rules enabling or encouraging stealth severances by
joint tenants who want to have their cake and eat it, too. How does
the stealth severance operate? At the risk of perpetuating fraud, like
so: An unscrupulous joint tenant makes a secret conveyance of his
joint tenancy interest and places it in a secure place where it will be
discovered upon his death. He then waits. If his unsuspecting fellow
tenant dies first, he destroys the secret severance instrument and
claims ownership of the entire property. If he dies first, he is secure in
knowing his interest will pass to his heirs. In this heads I win, tails you
lose scenario the unsuspecting tenant loses either way.
The stealth severance problem begins with courts that staunchly
adhere to the notion that a joint tenant may sever without the consent
or notice of the other tenants.326 This “power” of a joint tenant to
convey her interest in a joint tenancy without the knowledge or
consent of other tenants has even been described as an “indisputable
right.”327 Courts have parroted this sentiment for decades and some
legislatures have adopted similar positions.328 In New York, the rule is
crystal clear by statute: “In addition to any other means by which a
joint tenancy with right of survivorship may be severed, a joint tenant
may unilaterally sever a joint tenancy in real property without consent

324. See, e.g., Crowther v. Mower, 876 P.2d 876, 878 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (holding that
the quitclaim deed by which deceased spouse had conveyed her interest in property to her
son was valid and, thus, terminated the joint tenancy).
325. See Samuel M. Fetters, An Invitation to Commit Fraud: Secret Destruction of Joint
Tenant Survivorship Rights, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 173, 175 (1986); Swenson & Degnan,
supra note 9, at 469.
326. See, e.g., Smolen v. Smolen, 956 P.2d 128, 130 (Nev. 1998); In re Estate of
Hoffman, 653 N.W.2d 94, 98 (N.D. 2002); Crowther v. Mower, 876 P.2d 876, 878 (Utah Ct.
App. 1994).
327. E.g., Sathoff v. Sutterer, 869 N.E.2d 354, 356 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007).
328. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-31-101 (2012); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 240-b
(McKinney 1998); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 64.28.010 (West 2013); Burke v. Stevens, 70
Cal. Rptr. 87, 91 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968); Johnson v. Beneficial Fin. Co. of Ill., Inc., 506
N.E.2d 1025, 1027 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987); Reicherter v. McCauley, 283 P.3d 219, 222 (Kan.
Ct. App. 2012).
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of any non-severing joint tenant or tenants . . . .”329 California’s joint
tenancy statute is nearly verbatim, providing that a joint tenant may
sever without the joinder or consent of any other tenant.330
A growing movement permitting joint tenants to sever their
interest in a joint tenancy by self-conveyance further enhances the
hazard associated with stealth termination.331 At common law, a
conveyance from an individual as grantor to herself as grantee had no
legal effect on destroying any of the four unities, and therefore could
not effectuate a severance.332 Under a unities approach, a selfconveyance from the same grantor “as joint tenant” to the same
grantee “as tenant in common” was impossible.333 As a consequence,
a joint tenant who wanted to effectively sever her interest in a joint
tenancy would grant her interest in the property to a third-party
straw-person who would then immediately convey the property back
to the severing joint tenant.334 Courts have found this process
unnecessarily formalistic, and legislatures have agreed. This circuitous
process has been largely eliminated for creating joint tenancies and is
equally being scuttled in the severance context. Many modern courts
and legislatures deride this tortuous process and have eschewed its
requirement in the severance context.335 Nebraska’s joint tenancy
statute explicitly rejects this formalistic unities requirement by stating:
“the conveyance of all of the interest of one joint tenant to himself or
herself as grantee, in which the intention to effect a severance of the
joint tenancy expressly appears in the instrument, severs the joint
tenancy.”336 As the Utah Supreme Court cautioned in In re Estate of
Knickerbocker,337 when endorsing severance by self-conveyance, “an
unrecorded and unwitnessed unilateral transaction may allow one
329. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 240-c (McKinney 1998) (emphasis added).
330. CAL. CIV. CODE § 683.2 (West 2015).
331. THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 176, § 31.08(b), at 60.
332. See, e.g., In re Estate of Knickerbocker, 912 P.2d 969, 974 (Utah 1996).
333. THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 176, § 31.08(b), at 60.
334. Taylor v. Canterbury, 92 P.3d 961, 966–67 (Colo. 2004).
335. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-31-101 (2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 311
(2014); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 159 (2012); NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-118 (2009); N.Y.
REAL PROP. LAW § 240-c (McKinney 1998); UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-1-5 (LexisNexis
2012); Riddle v. Harmon, 162 Cal. Rptr. 530, 532 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980); Canterbury, 92 P.3d
at 967; Minonk State Bank v. Grassman, 432 N.E.2d 386, 390 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982); In re
Estate of Johnson, 739 N.W.2d 493, 496–97 (Iowa 2007); Reicherter v. McCauley, 283 P.3d
219, 222 (Kan. Ct. App. 2012); Johnson v. MacIntyre, 740 A.2d 599, 609 (Md. 1999);
Hendrickson v. Minneapolis Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 161 N.W.2d 688, 691 (Minn. 1968);
Edwin Smith, L.L.C. v. Synergy Operating, L.L.C., 285 P.3d 656, 664 (N.M. 2012); In re
Knickerbocker, 912 P.2d at 974–75.
336. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-118.
337. 912 P.2d 969 (Utah 1996).
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joint tenant to defraud the other.”338 Undoubtedly that is true. And it
is no wonder why the Utah legislature subsequently amended its joint
tenancy statute to provide that self-conveyances must be “bona fide”
to effectuate a severance.339 The logic in permitting self-conveyances
over formalistic straw-person conveyances is sound and one we
endorse, but not without additional protections for other tenants.
Those protections begin with demanding that instruments purporting
to terminate a joint tenancy be recorded in order to be effective.
c)

Effectuating Severance: Intent + Recording

Statutes and judicial opinions that sanctify self-conveyances
exacerbate the potential for stealth termination. Unfortunately, selfconveyances are not the only mechanism available to deceive fellow
tenants. A defrauding tenant may execute multiple deeds through a
straw-person and then later dispose of them,340 or a joint tenant may
convey her interest directly to her preferred heir with specific waitand-see instructions.341 The common strategy in each of these schemes
is for the severance instrument to remain unrecorded so that it may
be later suppressed if the passive, non-severing tenant should die first.
All of these schemes are easily remedied by statute.
A few states have addressed stealth termination by making
severance of an individual share in a joint tenancy effective only after
an instrument indicating an intent to sever has been publically
recorded.342 These states are notable both for inhibiting stealth
severances and the guidance they provide to the bench and bar.343 For
example, Colorado’s joint tenancy statute establishes a clear
mechanism by which a tenant may effectively terminate her interest
in a joint tenancy via unilateral self-conveyance.344 In that state, “a
joint tenant may sever the joint tenancy between himself or herself
and all remaining joint tenants by unilaterally executing and
recording an instrument conveying her interest in real property to
338. Id. at 976. The court recognized the inherent fraud associated with unwitnessed
and unrecorded unilateral transactions whereby one tenant attempts to secretly destroy a
joint tenancy. However, the court did not have to directly confront the secret severance
issue because the terminating tenant promptly recorded her self-conveyance.
339. UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-1-5 (West 2012).
340. See, e.g., Knickerbocker, 912 P.2d at 972.
341. See, e.g., Crowther v. Mower, 876 P.2d 876, 877–78 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
342. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-431 (2012); CAL. CIV. CODE § 683.2 (West
2015); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-31-101 (2012); MINN. STAT. § 500.19 (2001); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 57-1-5 (LexisNexis 2012).
343. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-431; CAL. CIV. CODE § 683.2; COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 38-31-101; MINN. STAT. § 500.19; UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-1-5.
344. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-31-101.
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himself or herself as tenant in common.”345 The Colorado approach is
notable for enabling user-friendly terminations by self-conveyance
instruments while prohibiting secret, wait-and-see schemes. Mere
execution of the self-conveyance instrument alone is insufficient to
effectuate a termination of the joint tenancy.346 The scheming joint
tenant who quietly executes and retains an instrument conveying his
interest in joint tenancy to himself as a tenant in common is foiled.
Colorado law demands that severance instruments be recorded and
directly ties the timing of the severance event to formal recording
rather than the date of execution by proclaiming that “[t]he joint
tenancy shall be severed upon recording such instrument.”347
Minnesota’s joint tenancy statute offers even more comprehensive
guidance by outlining the specific methods for and legal effectiveness
of severance:
Severance of estates in joint tenancy. A severance of a joint
tenancy interest in real estate by a joint tenant shall be legally
effective only if (1) the instrument of severance is recorded in
the office of the county recorder or the registrar of titles in the
county where the real estate is situated; or (2) the instrument of
severance is executed by all of the joint tenants; or (3) the
severance is ordered by a court of competent jurisdiction; or (4)
a severance is effected pursuant to bankruptcy of a joint
tenant.348
California goes one step further by prohibiting deathbed
severances made within three days of the severing tenant’s death.349
Any individual who takes title from a severing tenant by unrecorded
instrument merely holds a defeasible tenancy in common that is
subject to divestment if the nonsevering joint tenant survives the
severing joint tenant.350
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. Id. (emphasis added). One door left slightly open by the Colorado statute
concerns whether the heirs of a joint tenant who executed a secret severance could still
record the instrument postmortem and then claim an interest in the property. The plain
language of the entire statute would appear to foreclose this approach. To be effective,
unilateral self-conveyances must be executed and recorded. The clear intent of coupling
these two requirements appears to be aimed at prohibiting wait-and-see schemes.
Moreover, any relation-back claim would appear to fail because the statute says that
severance occurs upon recording rather than on the date of the instrument. Finally,
because the statute declares that death terminates a joint tenant’s interest, a post-mortem
severance would be ineffective because the deceased tenant has no interest to sever.
348. MINN. STAT. § 500.19 (2014) (emphasis added).
349. CAL. CIV. CODE § 683.2 (West 2015).
350. Id.
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Thus, unscrupulous tenants in these states must affirmatively
choose between being equally yoked to the survivorship gamble or
committing to an immediate severance. The defrauding tenant cannot
take a wait-and-see approach and expect the post-death discovery of
his unrecorded severance to be effective. These types of recording
mandates are commendable for foreclosing fraudulent schemes by
unscrupulous tenants. What they lack is any requirement for
transparency in the severance context. Other than those tenants who
spend their days combing through land records, recording statutes fail
to promote actual notice among joint tenants, leaving the vast
majority in the dark.
d)

The Severance High Road: Recording and Actual Notice

As we have seen, in today’s world, individuals in traditional and
non-traditional relationships routinely use joint tenancies for asset
management in an array of contexts.351 The survivorship feature offers
a will-substitute opportunity that avoids probate and eases transitions
in property ownership. Another alluring aspect of these estates is that
they are flexible. Any tenant may opt out of the survivorship feature
in favor of a tenancy in common.352 And, yet, their terminable nature
should not be characterized by secrecy or the fear of unilateral
severances being made unbeknownst to fellow tenants. A joint tenant
should not be expected to gamble both on survivorship and
transparency in the relationship. The nature of the relationship itself
necessitates pellucidity, especially in the context of spouses, and
courts have recognized that reliance and consideration often play a
role in the survivorship estate as well as the expectations of the
parties.353
A joint tenant who unilaterally severs without providing actual
notice to her fellow tenants deprives them of the opportunity to plan
their own disposition of the property both during life and after death.
A tenant who is informed that she will no longer survive to full
ownership may no longer desire to continue maintaining, improving,
and paying taxes on the property. Instead, she may decide to sell what

351. See supra notes 184–88 and accompanying text.
352. See supra Section IV.A.
353. See, e.g., Hendrickson v. Minneapolis Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 161 N.W.2d 688,
692 (Minn. 1968) (“If the survivor had taken some irrevocable action in reliance upon the
creation or existence of the joint tenancy, or if some consideration was given or received
when the joint tenancy was created, it would seem reasonable to insist that unilateral
action would not be effective to deprive the passive joint tenant of the rights so created.”).
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is now a tenancy in common interest or, at a minimum, consider who
among her heirs should receive her interest in the property.
On one end of the joint tenancy spectrum stands the inseverable
joint tenancy whose incident of survivorship cannot be abolished. At
the other stands the traditional joint tenancy estate that may be
unilaterally severed by a single tenant at-will without notice or
consent afforded other tenants. Neither inflexibility nor secrecy is an
appropriate model for the modern joint tenancy estate. Recording
statutes that offer constructive knowledge and objective criteria for
effectuating severance by a single tenant are commendable, but fail to
recognize that constructive notice is rarely notice at all. Thus, a
middle-ground and higher road that embraces flexibility and
transparency is needed—one that couples recording with actual
notice.
As the Illinois Supreme Court acknowledged, “it is necessary for
the common law to keep pace with the gradual changes of trade,
commerce, arts, inventions, and the exigencies and usages of the
country.”354 Modification of the rules applicable to creation and
severance of joint tenancies should be no different.355 The model for
the modern joint tenancy estate is one that may be created or
terminated only based upon express intent. Modern joint tenancies
should continue to maintain flexibility through unilateral severability.
However, in order to impede fraud by unscrupulous tenants,
severance should be effective only upon the pre-death recording of an
instrument stating an intent to terminate the survivorship. And,
finally, because of the nature of the relationship and the ease in which
notice may be effectuated in the technologically advanced age in
which we live, severance should not be effective without actual notice
to all other joint tenants.
CONCLUSION
Like the legend of the Seven Sleepers of Ephesus,356 the North
Carolina joint tenancy with right of survivorship slept sealed in a cave
for several centuries and awoke to a changed world. Because
traditional joint tenancy jurisprudence remained dormant until
1991,357 no North Carolina appellate court decision existed
354. Minonk State Bank v. Grassman, 447 N.E.2d 822, 824 (Ill. 1983) (quoting Amann
v. Eaidy, 114 N.E.2d 412, 418 (Ill. 1953)).
355. See id.
356. See, e.g., Catholic Encyclopedia: The Seven Sleepers of Ephesus, NEW ADVENT,
http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/05496a.htm (last visited Aug. 17, 2015).
357. See generally Orth, supra note 3 (describing the revision of G.S. 41-2).
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interpreting joint tenancy law until a mother unintentionally severed
a newborn joint tenancy by executing a deed of trust and mortgage
note at a real estate closing without the signatures of her fellow joint
tenants.
The lack of an inventory of appellate court decisions in this state
to inform predictable joint tenancy issues of creation and severance
presents a refreshing and challenging opportunity for members of the
practicing bar, judiciary, and General Assembly. In our opinion, the
opportunity presented requires adopting an intent-based approach to
both creation and severance. The joint tenancy of this millennium is
not the Colonial American unwanted vestige of British aristocracy.
Today, it is a useful, necessary, and flexible form of concurrent
property ownership for asset management and disposition.
While the traditional four unities may continue to be present in
the creation of some joint tenancies, three of the four are no longer
legal prerequisites. Modern joint tenancies come into being because
of express intent, not medieval unities requirements of time, title, and
interest. Likewise, severance should be primarily based on an express
intent to sever. Condoning accidental, counterintuitive severances
based on the destruction of archaic “unities” technicalities makes no
sense, and judicial precedent from other jurisdictions locked in the
past should be ignored when sufficient intent exists to preserve, not
terminate, a joint tenancy. The express intent standard required to
create a joint tenancy should likewise apply to terminating a joint
tenancy.
G.S. 41-2(a) should be revised to accommodate any form of
language intended to create a joint tenancy with right of survivorship.
While use of the precise formula “as joint tenants with right of
survivorship” is the real property expert’s choice, any word
combination evincing an intent to hold property as joint tenants
should be honored. In the absence of clarification by the General
Assembly, progressive judicial interpretation reflecting modern
trends and usage should be based on intent, even in the absence
magic words.
Severance issues should also be clarified by the General
Assembly. G.S. 41-2(a1), the legislative reaction to the Countrywide
decision, is fundamentally flawed. It is practically indecipherable
when applied to predictable fact situations and, therefore, must be
reconsidered and clarified. Some easily identifiable severance issues
related to divorce, partition, or the execution of a contract to convey
or lease by one or more joint tenants should also be addressed by
clarifying legislation. The issue of “stealth” severances—allowed
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under the common law without notice to the other joint tenant or
joint tenants—should also be addressed by embracing actual notice
and recording requirements for instruments that specifically include
language of express intent to sever.
Finally, there is an important preventive law role to be played by
practicing attorneys. The inclusion of provisions stating the intent of
joint tenant parties in contracts to convey, leases, and other
instruments may go a long way in avoiding later disputes and
litigation. Attorneys should also be acutely aware of possible
severance issues in partition and divorce proceedings until legislative
and judicial guidance is afforded.

